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Introduction
Despite their centrol role in economic analysis, the assumptions that indi-
viduals behave rationally and maximize their self-interested payo¤s does not
match with a large body of evidence from psychology and experimental eco-
nomics. Economic agents often pursue objectives other than self-interested
payo¤ maximization. Many observed departures from such behavior arise
through actions that consider other-regarding or social preferences.
This dissertation is composed of four papers, all related to other-regarding
preferences, more specically, reciprocity and inequity aversion. If a player
has such preferences, then she does not only care about her payo¤, but also
the other playerspayo¤s. Furthermore, a reciprocal player places a positive
weight on the payo¤ of another player if she expects the latter to take a fur-
ther positive action than the one she perceives as fair (positive reciprocity);
and a negative weight if she expects the reverse (negative reciprocity). Our
reciprocity models thus follow Segal and Sobel (2007). Moreover, the recip-
rocal players perception on the fair action of the other serves as a reference
level, which is another widely used behavioral concept. A key aspect of recip-
rocal preferences is that players do not only care about the outcomes of their
actions, but also the actions of other players.
ix
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An inequity averse player, on the other hand, maximizes her payo¤, but
also tries to reduce the di¤erence between her payo¤s and those of the rivals.
She dislikes advantages inequity: she feels compassion towards others when
the average payo¤s of others is less than her own payo¤. At the same time,
she dislikes disadvantage inequity: she feels envious towards others when the
average payo¤s of others is more than her own payo¤. Our inequity aversion
model thus follows Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
All of this has led to the general goal of this dissertation, which is to
understand the implications of such behavioral concepts in environments,
where players with such non-standard preferences compete or cooperate.
In the rst three chapters the implications of fairness and reciprocity is
studied in di¤erent environments. In particular, in Chapter 1 we study
the implications of fairness and reciprocity for self-enforcing international
environmental agreements on pollution abatement. To this end, we develop
a dynamic game, in which countries with reciprocal preferences attempt to
maintain international environmental cooperation. In our context, recipro-
cal countries reward kind behavior, but retaliate against countries behaving
unfairly. Moreover, we maintain the assumption that binding commitments
cannot be made at the international level and countries are therefore limited
to cooperative environmental agreements that are self-enforcing. In such a
setting, a country will choose to adhere to the cooperative path as long as the
onetime gains it could achieve by unilaterally deviating from its agreed-upon
environmental policies do not outweigh the discounted future welfare losses
due to the ensuing breakdown of multilateral cooperation and the emergence
of a noncooperative equilibrium characterized by ine¢ ciently low abatement
INTRODUCTION xi
standards.
We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that have moderate expecta-
tions from each other with respect to their national abatement strategies can
support a greater degree of environmental cooperation than self-interested
ones. However, when only very high abatement standards are deemed fair,
then reciprocity could have a detrimental e¤ect on international environ-
mental cooperation. Our model therefore provides a novel perspective on
the failure and the recent success of the 2009 and 2010 U.N. Climate Change
Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, respectively. Finally, we show that
these results are robust to endogenizing fair-abatement-standard perceptions.
Chapter 2 is in the same line with Chapter 1, but in this Chapter we ex-
plore the impact of fairness and reciprocity on multilateral tari¤ cooperation.
We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that are moderately demanding
from their trading partners regarding their commercial policy can support a
greater degree of cooperation than self-interested ones. However, when only
very liberal import policies are considered fair, then reciprocity could have
a detrimental e¤ect on multilateral tari¤ cooperation. Thus, our model pro-
vides a novel reason for the occasional failure of trade negotiations. Finally,
our results are robust to endogenizing fair-tari¤ perceptions.
In Chapter 3 we study the rm behavior with managers that are mo-
tivated in part by personal animosityor respecttowards their rivals. A
reciprocal manager responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind ac-
tions, while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with
kind actions. We nd that if fairness payo¤s are small by comparison with
INTRODUCTION xii
monetary payo¤s, then collusive action proles (prices or quantities) are eas-
ier to sustain when rms have reciprocal managers. Thus, fairness concerns
among rms with reciprocal managers can have adverse welfare consequences
for consumers.
In Chapter 4 we explore the role of inequity aversion as an explana-
tion for observed behavior in experimental Cournot oligopoly. We show that
inequity aversion can change the nature of the strategic interaction: quan-
tities are strategic substitutes for su¢ ciently asymmetric output levels but
strategic complements otherwise. We nd that inequity aversion can explain
why: (i) some experiments result in higher than Cournot-Nash production
levels while others result in lower, (ii) collusion often occurs with only two
players whereas with three or more players market outcomes are very close
to Cournot-Nash, and (iii) players often achieve equal prots in asymmetric
Cournot oligopoly.
Chapter 1
International Environmental
Cooperation under Fairness
and Reciprocity
This paper explores the implications of fairness and reciprocity for self-
enforcing international environmental agreements on pollution abatement.
Reciprocal countries reward kind behavior (positive reciprocity), but retaliate
against countries behaving unfairly (negative reciprocity). We demonstrate
that reciprocal countries that have moderate expectations from each other
with respect to their national abatement strategies can support a greater de-
gree of environmental cooperation than self-interested ones. However, when
only very high abatement standards are deemed fair, then reciprocity could
have a detrimental e¤ect on international environmental cooperation. Our
model therefore provides a novel perspective on the failure of the Copenhagen
summit and the recent success of the Cancun one. Finally, we show that these
results are robust to endogenizing fair-abatement-standard perceptions.
Keywords: Reciprocity; Environmental agreements; Abatement standards;
Repeated games
JEL Classication: Q50; Q58; D63
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CHAPTER 1. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
UNDER FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine international environmental agreements (IEAs) on
pollution abatement among governments with reciprocal preferences for en-
vironmental policy. Governments with reciprocal preferences reward kind
or fair actions (positive reciprocity), whereas they punish unkind or
unfairbehavior (negative reciprocity). The signicance of this is twofold.
First, governments seem to exhibit such preferences, at least with regard to
environmental policy. Second, our analysis provides important insights into
the successes and failures of international environmental negotiations.
Many environmental problems are transboundary in nature and often
have a global scope (e.g., climate change or marine pollution). Countries
have therefore been seeking to sign IEAs in order to coordinate their envi-
ronmental policies. Typically, governments stress the importance of fairness
in sharing the burden of environmental protection. In fact, it is clearly stated
in the Copenhagen Accord, the outcome of the 2009 United Nations (UN)
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, that its endorsers shall...on the
basis of equity...enhance [their] long-term cooperative action to combat cli-
mate change.1 In a similar spirit, France at the onset of the Copenhagen
summit, in response to Indias commitment to reduce emissions, expressed
her determination to work with India and all her partners to put together
an ambitious, just and balanced agreement in Copenhagen,while President
Obama at a press conference at the end of the summit agreed that it is
not fair to expect developing countries like China and India to be bound by
the same set of legal obligations as developed countries in the ght against
1See http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
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climate change.2 Moreover, fairness considerations are central to the UN
Environment Programme Medium-term Strategy 20102013 and to the o¢ -
cial environmental policy agendas of most countries, including the European
Union (EU) and the US.3
At the same time, the emphasis governments place on reciprocity is
equally strong. As a matter of fact, reciprocity considerations did play a
pivotal role in the disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen summit. In
particular, most analysts agree that the principal reason for the failure of
the summit was the disagreement between countries especially between the
US and the BASIC countries (i.e., Brazil, South Africa, India, and China)
led by China on how to share the burden of reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Essentially, the negotiations in Copenhagen revolved around fairness
and reciprocity, with countries rejecting the various deals proposed as unfair
or one-sided; and when the talks were concluded, participants started accus-
ing each other of a total lack of willingness to compromise or reciprocate. For
instance, early in the negotiations, one of Indias top negotiators expressed
concern...that [India has] been o¤ering unilateral concessions, without ob-
taining any reciprocity.4 Furthermore, after the summit, the G77 group of
130 developing nations blamed President Obama for locking the poor into
2See, respectively, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/France-welcomes-India-s-
climate.html and http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-o¢ ce/remarks-president-during-
press-availability-copenhagen.
3For the UN Environment Programme Medium-term Strategy 2010
2013, see http://www.unep.org/PDF/FinalMTSGCSS-X-8.pdf. See, respec-
tively, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/development_en.htm and
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/climate/index.html for the EU and
US environmental policy agendas.
4See http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/73850/Top%20Stories/Copenhagen+sum
mit+braces+for+a+no+deal.html.
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permanent poverty by refusing to reduce US emissions further,while the
UKs Prime Minister Gordon Brown argued that, If America and China
were able to show they were doing more and I believe that they can, then
all countries Australia, Brazil, Japan, Korea all those countries that have
ranges [of emission cuts] would be prepared to go to their highest level of
ambition.5 In brief, in the international environmental arena, governments
seem, to some extent, to not be simply maximizers of their own self-interested
welfare, but to rather be exhibiting some preferences for fairness and reci-
procity.6
On a more theoretical level, there is an extensive and rapidly growing
literature providing evidence of both positive and negative reciprocity in in-
dividual decision making.7 Political-economy models of environmental policy
then suggest that if individuals have such preferences, these preferences will
be reected in the objective functions of governments. The rst model we can
invoke here is the median-voter model, where the government chooses policies
that reect majority opinion on the issue (in order to remain popular and stay
5See http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/19/copenhagen-blame-game
and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8423831.stm, respectively.
6It is important to underscore here that fairness in this context is entirely subjective.
It depends only on governmentsperceptions and should not be confused with what is
objectively or ethically fair. For the purposes of this paper, fairness simply relates to the
reference level of governments regarding other countriesenvironmental policies (see also
footnote 12).
7For instance, experiments asking individuals to contribute to public goods typically
nd that their contributions far exceed what self-interested utility maximization would
entail (e.g., Andreoni, 1988; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; Croson, 2007). This is usually
interpreted as evidence of positive reciprocity. Analogous results arise from trust or gift-
exchange experiments (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr et al., 1998). On the
other hand, evidence for negative reciprocity is found in ultimatum-game experiments with
the typical result being that people reject o¤ers that would be accepted under the self-
interested hypothesis (e.g., Güth et al., 1982; Roth et al., 1991). Moreover, using survey
data, Dohmen et al. (2009) provide evidence of both positive and negative reciprocity.
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in o¢ ce).8 In such a setting, if the median voter has reciprocal preferences,
then the governments actions will mirror these preferences. Alternatively,
we could look at interest-group models. The framework that currently occu-
pies center stage in the literature is that of Grossman and Helpman (1994),
who focus on trade-policy issues. More specically, in their paper, the incum-
bent government maximizes a weighted average of aggregate social welfare
and political contributions by lobbies that wish to inuence trade policy.
Their framework has subsequently been applied to environmental policy by
Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998), among others. In these lobbying mod-
els, if individuals have preferences for reciprocity, these preferences will enter
into the governments objective function with some weight.9
A question that naturally arises at this point is whether voters exhibit
reciprocal preferences towards environmental policy. There exists consider-
able evidence that seems to suggest so. For example, in an October 1998
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll, 44% of Americans
agreed that the US should refuse to sign the Kyoto treaty until all the
less-developed countries commit to limits,providing clear evidence of neg-
ative reciprocity.10 In another PIPA poll in September-October 2009, 68%
of respondents in 15 (developed and developing) countries endorsed the view
that if their own country took measures to deal with the problem of cli-
mate change, then other countries would be more willing to act, reecting
8See, for example, Eriksson and Persson (2003) and McAusland (2003).
9In fact, one could argue that governments are not genuinely motivated by fairness
considerations, but only push for fairer environmental policies in order to increase their
political support, since voters have such considerations. In any case, our results depend
solely on governments exhibiting, to some degree, reciprocal preferences towards environ-
mental policy, and not on why this is the case.
10See http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/global_warming/gw3.cfm.
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positive-reciprocity thinking among individuals.11 Another important con-
clusion that could be drawn from these surveys is that people have an explicit
notion of what the appropriateenvironmental policies entail, i.e., they have
a reference level regarding environmental policy against which the policies
implemented by their own government or by the rest of the world can be
evaluated.12 For instance, in a 25-nation PIPA poll conducted November
2006 through January 2007, people around the globe were asked to evalu-
ate the US handling of global warming or climate change. The percentage
of respondents who were not sure/declined to answer was on average only
18%.13 Analogous results were obtained in a 2009 23-nation PIPA survey
regarding the handling of climate change by the US and China.14 Similarly,
in a special Eurobarometer survey on Europeansattitudes towards climate
change conducted in late August and September 2009, Europeans were asked
whether the EU and their national government are doing enough to ght cli-
mate change. Only 12% of the respondents in the former case and 8% in the
latter were unsure/declined to answer.15 Finally, there exist numerous non-
governmental/nonprot organizations devoted solely to the promotion of en-
vironmental protection and sustainable development, in which large numbers
of people become organized. These organizations most often openly advocate
11See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/Background-
report.pdf.
12The reference levelis a concept widely studied in the behavioral economics literature.
For more on this, see, for instance, Helson (1964) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991).
13See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan07/BBC_USRole_Jan07_qua
ire.pdf.
14See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/nov09/WPO_China_Nov09_qua
ire.pdf.
15See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_322_en.pdf.
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fairness and reciprocity in international environmental cooperation.16
To address the implications of reciprocity and fairness for IEAs on pol-
lution abatement, we develop a dynamic game in which reciprocal countries
facing a free-riding Prisoners Dilemma problem in their dealings with one
another attempt to maintain cooperation in their national abatement strate-
gies, where pollution is assumed to be transboundary in nature. Given the
lack of a supranational authority with e¤ective enforcement mechanisms re-
garding environmental policy, we restrict our attention to IEAs that are
self-enforcing, as in Ferrara et al. (2009). In this context, a country will
choose today to adhere to the cooperative path as long as the onetime gain
it could achieve by unilaterally deviating from its agreed-upon abatement
policies does not outweigh the discounted future welfare losses due to the en-
suing breakdown in international environmental cooperation. It is important
to stress here that we completely abstract from participation considerations
in this paper. We instead look for the most cooperative equilibrium that can
be supported by reciprocal countries within the context of a self-enforcing
international agreement involving full participation.17 This is in line with re-
cent experiences with the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements,
to which 140 and 193 countries, respectively, have agreed, including all the
major (polluting) economies. On the other hand, to model reciprocity, we
follow Segal and Sobel (2007). More specically, we assume that a country
16See, for example, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/pla
net-2/report/2009/5/greenpeace-climate-vision.pdf for the climate vision of Greenpeace.
17For further elaboration on these points, see Barrett (1994), Wagner (2001), and Barrett
(2005), among others. Note also that self-enforcing agreements involving full participation
are commonly employed in the literature on multilateral trade negotiations (e.g., Dam,
1970; Dixit, 1987; Bagwell and Staiger, 2002).
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attaches a positive (negative) weight to the self-interested welfare of another
country if it expects the latter to behave kindly (unkindly) by setting a
higher (lower) abatement standard than the one it perceives as fair. In other
words, countries are assumed to have preferences over both outcomes and
strategies.18
We nd that reciprocal countries that have moderate expectations from
each other with respect to environmental policy (i.e., when the abatement
standards considered fair are not too high, but at the same time, too little
pollution abatement is considered unfair) can support a higher degree of
environmental cooperation and thus achieve higher welfare than can self-
interested countries. The intuition underlying this result is straightforward.
For such fair-abatement-standard perceptions, in the reciprocal game (i) the
punitive Nash abatement standard is lower than in the self-interested game,
which acts to make the punishment phase costlier in the former game; and (ii)
countries are in a positive-reciprocity state. As a result, under the scenario
in question, reciprocal countries are faced with both a weaker incentive to
cheat and a stronger incentive to cooperate than self-interested ones, allowing
them to support a greenerequilibrium.
However, when reciprocal countries are highly demanding of each other
regarding their environmental policies (i.e., when only very high abatement
levels are perceived as fair), then the impact of reciprocity on international
environmental cooperation is ambiguous. Intuitively, in such a case, recip-
rocal countries are in a negative-reciprocity state, meaning that they face
18Lange and Vogt (2003) also examine IEAs among countries with nonstandardpref-
erences. However, their focus is on preferences for equity. Moreover, unlike here, they look
at coalition formation.
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a stronger incentive to defect than self-interested ones. On the other hand,
their incentive to cooperate remains stronger (due to the lower punitive Nash
abatement standard), but there exist cases in which the stronger-incentive-to-
cheat e¤ect dominates, leading to less pollution abatement in the reciprocal
equilibrium as compared with the self-interested one. Finally, we show that
these results are robust to allowing for fair-abatement-standard perceptions
that are endogenously determined during the course of the game.
At a more general level, our ndings provide a novel insight into the suc-
cesses or failures of international environmental negotiations. In particular,
assuming countries have (some) preferences for fairness and reciprocity, our
results suggest that if they arrive at the negotiations table with expecta-
tions that are greatly elevated (for whatever reason), this could prove to be
counterproductive, in the sense that they might no longer be able to support
very greenpolicies. It could then be argued that this might be one of the
plausible explanations for the failure of the Copenhagen summit. There is
little doubt that the pre-Copenhagen expectations for what could have been
accomplished there were very high. For instance, according to the o¢ cial
UN website, more than 100 world leaders met in New York in September
2009 in order to mobilize political will and strengthen momentum for a fair,
e¤ective, and ambitious climate deal in Copenhagen.19 The same level of
ambition is expressed in the quote from the French government above. Our
ndings, however, demonstrate that such ambitious expectations, repre-
sented in our model by high fair-abatement-standard perceptions, could end
up hindering the e¤orts for deeper international environmental cooperation.
19See http://un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/lang/en/pages/2009summit.
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In fact, this possibility had been anticipated by a number of analysts and
negotiators before the summit. For example, in November 2009, Susanne
Dröge from the German Institute for International and Security A¤airs said
that high expectations for the summit had to be adjusted, and noted that
it was important that the expectations were adjusted before the summit,
because otherwise the outcome would be bad.20
By contrast, at the 2010 UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, ex-
pectations were much more modest. As a matter of fact, the UN Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon, in his address to the opening ceremony of the high-
level segment of the Cancun talks, urged nations to not be too demanding.
He said, We dont need nal agreement on all the issues, but we do need
progress on all the fronts. We cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the
good.21 In the light, then, of our model, it could be argued that the mod-
est expectations in place at the Cancun summit could in part account for
its success. As The Economist concludes, So why did Cancun succeed in
making progress within the UN process where Copenhagen so spectacularly
failed? One reason is low expectations. Copenhagen was meant to produce
an all-encompassing agreement; Cancun was expected to embarrass itself.22
In summary, expectations emerge as a key factor in our analysis, having a
signicant e¤ect on what can be achieved in the international environmental
arena. Actually, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to identify
such a role for expectations in multilateral environmental negotiations. The
policy implications are then immediate. The careful management of expec-
20Can Copenhagen Still Be Saved?The Economist, November 17, 2009.
21See http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/dec/08/ban-ki-moon-cancun-
climate-deal.
22See http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/12/climate_change?page=1.
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tations is critical for the success of international environmental negotiations,
and most importantly, the creation of a pre-negotiations high-expectations
environment should be avoided.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out
the basics. Section 3 characterizes the static Nash equilibrium of our model,
whereas Section 4 analyzes the dynamic game. Section 5 presents a simplied
model in order to better illustrate the main insights from our analysis, while
Section 6 endogenizes countries fair-abatement-standard perceptions. Fi-
nally, Section 7 o¤ers some concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
1.2 The Model
We assume that the world consists of two countries, A and B, which trade
two goods, a and b.23 This focus on a two-country world is nonrestrictive,
as our ndings readily extend to N > 2 countries.24 Country J is endowed
with 1 unit of good  j and zero units of good j, where J 2 fA;Bg and
j 2 fa; bg.25 Countries can either consume or export their endowment, or
alternatively use it for pollution abatement. On the consumption side, we
assume that demand functions are symmetric across countries and goods, and
that the demand for good j is independent of the price of good  j. More
specically, the demand in country J for good j is given byD
 
P Jj

, where P Jj
23Our framework is inspired by Bagwell and Staiger (1999b).
24Upon request, a tecnical appendix is available from the authors in which an N -country
model is presented.
25We choose to ignore the production process in the two countries for expositional
simplicity. In any case, this assumption does not a¤ect the qualitative nature of our
ndings.
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is good js price in J . We maintain the standard assumptions that D
 
P Jj

is strictly positive on some bounded interval
h
0; P
J
j

, that D
 
P Jj

= 0 for
P Jj  P
J
j , and that D
 
P Jj

is twice continuously di¤erentiable in P Jj with
D0
 
P Jj

< 0 for P Jj 2
h
0; P
J
j

. Given this setup, good j ( j) is country Js
natural import (export) good.
In each period, country J unilaterally selects its abatement standard
qJ 2

0; qJO

so as to maximize its individual welfare, where qJO < 1 is the
abatement level country J would choose under full international coopera-
tion.26 Pollution abatement is assumed to consume a fraction of a countrys
endowment. In particular, country J has a post-abatement endowment of
good  j of 1  qJ units available for domestic consumption or export. The
aggregate environmental damage country J , then, faces is a function of the
level of its own emissions and those of country  J :
	J
 
qJ ; q J

=
1
2

1  qJ + s
 
1  q J
2
, (1.1)
where s 2 (s; 1] is the degree of transboundary pollution, with s > 0.27
As s converges to s, pollution becomes more local in nature, whereas as s
converges to 1, pollution becomes a pure public bad a¤ecting both countries
equally.
We assume that the countries engage in free trade, implying P Jj = P
 J
j ,
26As will become evident below, country J would never nd it optimal to select an
abatement standard higher than qJO. We can therefore restrict the range of q
J to

0; qJO

without loss of generality.
27As we discuss below, we assume s to be su¢ ciently high so that in the absence of an
IEA, the countries would underinvest in pollution abatement from the point of view of
global e¢ ciency. See also footnote 33.
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8j.28 Letting X Jj
 
P Jj

= 1  q J  D
 
P Jj

denote country  Js export
supply function, the equilibrium prices can then be obtained from the usual
market-clearing conditions:
D
 
P Jj

= X Jj
 
P Jj

. (1.2)
As expected, the equilibrium price of good j is increasing in country  Js
abatement e¤orts (or, equivalently, decreasing in country Js post-abatement
endowment of j).
The countries have preferences for fairness and reciprocity. More pre-
cisely, the welfare of country J is given by:
RW J
 
qJ ; q J ; q Jf

= SW J
 
qJ ; q J

+ wJ(q J ; q Jf )SW
 J  qJ ; q J .
(1.3)
The rst term, SW J , is the self-interested (or standard) welfare function,
i.e., the sum of consumer and producer surplus minus environmental damage:
SW J
 
qJ ; q J

=
Z PJj
PJj (q
 J )
D (P ) dP +
Z PJ j
PJ j(q
J )
D (P ) dP
+
 
1  qJ

P J j
 
qJ

 	J
 
qJ ; q J

. (1.4)
The second term, wJ(q J ; q Jf )SW
 J , captures the fairness payo¤ for coun-
try J , where  > 0 is a scaling factor, and wJ(q J ; q Jf ) determines the
(scaled) weight country J places on  Js self-interested welfare SW J and
28It is direct to show that our basic ndings are robust to the introduction of (opti-
mally set) import tari¤s. We therefore abstract from trade-protection considerations for
analytical convenience. Upon request, a technical appendix is available from the authors
in which import tari¤s are introduced into our framework.
13
CHAPTER 1. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
UNDER FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY
is of the following form:
wJ(q J ; q Jf )
8>>><>>>:
> 0 if q J > q Jf
= 0 if q J = q Jf
< 0 otherwise
, (1.5)
with q Jf being the q
 J country J deems fair.We maintain the assumptions
that country Js weight function wJ(q J ; q Jf ) is twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable in both arguments, is strictly decreasing in its own fair-abatement-level
perception, and is strictly increasing in country  Js abatement level. We
also assume that fair-abatement-standard perceptions are common knowl-
edge.
To gain some insight into (1.5), note rst that an increase in q J has
two o¤setting e¤ects on the self-interested welfare of country J . On the one
hand, it has a positive environmental e¤ect, as it results in lower aggregate
environmental damage for country J . On the other hand, it has a negative
terms-of-trade e¤ect, as it leads to a higher price of good j. Observe further
that the rst e¤ect is a function of the degree of transboundary pollution
s, whereas the latter e¤ect is independent of s. It follows that as long as s
is su¢ ciently high, which is our working assumption throughout the paper,
the environmental e¤ect of an increase in q J on country Js self-interested
welfare outweighs its terms-of-trade e¤ect, i.e., country Js self-interested
welfare rises as country  J implements a higher abatement standard.
The interpretation of the weight function wJ is then straightforward upon
recalling that a reciprocal country cares about the other countrys intentions.
More specically, if country J expects country  J to set an abatement stan-
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dard higher than the one it perceives as fair, then it is willing to sacrice
some of its own self-interested welfare in order to reward  J , exhibiting pos-
itive reciprocity. If instead country J expects country  J to behave unfairly
by selecting an abatement standard below the one it considers fair, then it
is willing to sacrice some of its self-interested welfare in order to punish
 J , exhibiting negative reciprocity. Finally, if q J is exactly equal to q Jf ,
then RW J collapses to SW J , i.e., the reciprocal and self-interested welfare
functions coincide for country J . In sum, equation (1.5) signies that from
country Js perspective, any q J in excess of q Jf is a fair (or kind) action
that should be rewarded, whereas any q J below q Jf is an unfair (or unkind)
action that should be punished.
1.3 Static Game
Our aim in this section is to characterize the static Nash equilibrium of our
model, and compare it with the one that would emerge in a game with self-
interested countries. This equilibrium will serve as a credible punishment
in the dynamic game explored in the next section, the threat of which can
support international environmental cooperation in a repeated setting.29 To
this end, let the static game with self-interested countries be represented
by  S (SW ), while  R (RW;w; !q f ) denotes the static game with reciprocal
countries, where  !q f 
 
qJf ; q
 J
f

is the fair-abatement-standard vector. We
henceforth assume that qJf = q
 J
f  qf , i.e., the countries share a common
29Note that the static Nash equilibrium would be the unique equilibrium for the dynamic
game as well if an IEA were not feasible (e.g., due to exogenous, political reasons or because
the countries were highly impatient and did not value the future at all).
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fair-abatement-level perception. The reason for this assumption is twofold.
First, it considerably simplies our analysis. Second, asymmetries of a not
too high degree in fair-abatement-level perceptions between the (otherwise
symmetric) countries would not a¤ect the qualitative nature of our nd-
ings.30 In addition, in all that follows, we maintain the assumption that 
is su¢ ciently small, meaning that the relative weight of the fairness payo¤
in the countriesobjective function (or, equivalently, the relative weight the
countries attach to each others self-interested welfare) is not too high.31
It is direct to show that given that  is su¢ ciently small, the cross-partial
derivative of the welfare function of reciprocal country J with respect to its
own abatement level and country Js abatement standard is strictly negative
(i.e., @RW J=@qJ@q J < 0). In other words, the choice variables are (strict)
strategic substitutes, reecting the free-riding incentives the countries face
in their dealings with one another. Furthermore, given that s is high in
our setting, the cross-partial derivative of country Js welfare function with
respect to its abatement level and its fair-abatement-standard perception is
strictly negative (i.e., @RW J=@qJ@qf < 0). To understand the sign of the
latter derivative, simply recall that (i) given our focus on highdegrees of
transboundary pollution, the positive environmental e¤ect of an increase in
qJ on country  Js self-interested welfare outweighs its negative terms-of-
trade e¤ect, i.e., pollution abatement by country J exerts a positive exter-
30Upon request, a technical appendix is available from the authors in which we repro-
duce our analysis allowing for asymmetries in fair-abatement-level perceptions between
the countries that are not too high. See also footnote 36.
31The derivation of a closed-form solution for the upper bound of  has proved elusive.
In the simulations in Section 5, where we present a simplied model,  is set less than or
equal to 0.1.
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nality on country  J ; and (ii) a lower qf results ceteris paribus in a larger
wJ .
As we show in the Appendix, both  R (RW;w; !q f ) and  S (SW ) admit
largest and smallest pure symmetric Nash equilibria. In fact, if the coun-
triesbest-response functions have a slope strictly greater than  1, which
we henceforth assume, then  R (RW;w; !q f ) and  S (SW ) have unique equi-
libria:  !q NR = (qNR; qNR) and  !q NS = (qNS; qNS), respectively.32 Moreover,
it can be readily shown that the Nash equilibria of  R (RW;w; !q f ) and
 S (SW ) are characterized by an ine¢ ciently low level of pollution abate-
ment, i.e., qOR > qNR and qOS > qNS, with qOR > qOS, where qOR (qOS)
maximizes the countriesjoint welfare, RW J+RW J (SW J+SW J).33 The
latter result stems from the fact that given pollution is relatively transbound-
ary, there exist signicant pollution-abatement spillover e¤ects, resulting in
a suboptimal level of pollution abatement in the absence of an environmental
agreement. However, under full international cooperation, the spillover ef-
fects would be internalized by both countries and therefore, higher abatement
standards would be implemented.
We next show how countriesfair-abatement-level perception a¤ects qNR.
Lemma 1 The (pure) Nash equilibrium of  R (RW;w; !q f ),
 !q NR = (qNR; qNR), is strictly decreasing in the fair abatement standard qf ,
i.e., @qNR=@qf < 0.
32This assumption is not critical for our results. It is just made for expositional sim-
plicity.
33The ine¢ ciency of the static Nash equilibria is shown in a technical ap-
pendix available from the authors upon request. We also demonstrate there
that s = max fsS ; sRg, where sS satises  D
 
P J j (qNS)
  
@P J j (qNS) =@q
J

+
sS (1  qNS) (1 + sS) = 0 and sR satises  D
 
P J j (qNR)
  
@P J j (qNR) =@q
J

+
sR (1  qNR) (1 + sR)+wJ(qNR; qf )
 
@SW J=@qJ

+
 
@wJ(qNR; qf )=@q
J

SW J = 0.
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Intuitively, as we argued above, for a given q J , a higher qf leads to a smaller
wJ . Consequently, as qf rises, country J chooses its environmental policy
with less of country  Js interests in mind, resulting in a Nash equilibrium
characterized by less pollution abatement worldwide.
The following (nonrestrictive) assumption is now introduced: qf  qNS,
i.e., too little pollution abatement is considered unfair, which is a reasonable
assumption given our focus on environmental cooperation among countries.
We nally compare the reciprocal static Nash abatement standard, qNR, with
the self-interested one, qNS, as well as the welfare obtained in  R (RW;w;
 !q f )
and  S(SW ).
Proposition 1 Under our models assumptions, (i) qNR  qNS; and (ii)
for any country J , RW J ( !q NR; qf )  SW J( !q NS), with equalities holding in
either case if and only if qf = qNS.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that as compared with self-interested countries,
reciprocal ones select lower Nash abatement standards, and thus, end up with
lower welfare in Nash equilibrium. The intuition underlying Proposition 1 is
direct. At qNS, reciprocal countries are in a negative-reciprocity state wishing
to punish each other by lowering their abatement standards (since qf  qNS).
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium abatement standard of  R(RW;w; !q f ) is
lower than that of  S(SW ).
1.4 Dynamic Game
We now study repeated interaction between the countries. More specically,
the dynamic game we consider is simply the static one analyzed above in-
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nitely repeated. We assume that countries cannot make binding international
commitments, but are instead limited to environmental agreements that are
self-enforcing. In such a setting, countries can still maintain international
environmental cooperation, whose degree depends critically on how severely
they can credibly punish an o¤ender. Our aim in this section is to inves-
tigate the ramications of fairness and reciprocity for the most cooperative
abatement-standard equilibrium that can be supported within the context of
an IEA involving full participation. In other words, we totally abstract from
participation considerations, which is in line with recent experiences with the
Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements, to which participation has
been almost universal.
To this end, denote the dynamic game with reciprocal countries by
 R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ), and the one with self-interested countries by  S1 (SW ).
Moreover, let  2 (0; 1) denote the discount factor between periods. Given
the overall symmetry of our framework, for both games we focus on symmet-
ric cooperative subgame-perfect equilibria in which (i) along the equilibrium
path, the countries implement a common cooperative abatement standard
qC 2 (qNS; qOS] in each period; and (ii) if at any point in the game a de-
fection occurs, both countries revert from the following period onwards to
the noncooperative Nash abatement standard of the (relevant) stage game.34
In other words, to enforce environmental cooperation, the countries employ
grim-trigger strategies.
Let us begin our analysis with the dynamic game with self-interested
34Note that for both games we restrict our attention to cooperative abatement standards
above qNS but below qOS . This enables us to better compare  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ) with
 S1 (SW ), which is our main goal in this paper.
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countries,  S1 (SW ). To derive the incentive-compatibility constraint for
self-interested country J , we rst look at its static incentive to cheat, 
JS,
which simply equals the onetime increase it achieves in welfare when it opti-
mally cheats by choosing an abatement standard on its reaction curve, while
country  J still cooperates with qC :

JS (qC)  SW J
 
BRJS (qC) ; qC

  SW J ( !q C)  SW JD   SW JC , (1.6)
where  !q C  (qC ; qC) and BRJS (qC) is country Js best-response abatement
standard to qC .
However, defection by any country leads to a permanent breakdown in
international cooperation. Therefore, the discounted future welfare cost a
defector faces is the discounted di¤erence between the welfare under cooper-
ation and the welfare in the punishment phase, given by:

1  
 
SW J ( !q C)  SW J ( !q NS)

 
1  
 
SW JC   SW JN

 
1  !
J
S (qC) ,
(1.7)
where  !q NS  (qNS; qNS) and !JS is the per-period value of cooperation for
country J .
Thus, the incentive-compatibility condition for self-interested country J
to adhere to the cooperative path in  S1 (SW ) is that the onetime gain from
defection, 
JS, does not exceed the discounted future value of cooperation,
(=1  )!JS:

JS (qC) 

1  !
J
S (qC) . (1.8)
It follows from (1.8) that a given cooperative abatement standard qC can
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be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of  S1 (SW ) as long as the
countries are patient enough, or:
  SqC 
SW JD   SW JC
SW JD   SW JN
. (1.9)
Analogous relationships hold for reciprocal countries. More specically,
the incentive-compatibility constraint for reciprocal country J to uphold in-
ternational environmental cooperation in  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ) is given by:

JR (qC) 

1  !
J
R (qC) . (1.10)
Furthermore, reciprocal countries can support a given cooperative abatement
standard qC as long as they su¢ ciently value the future, or:
  RqC 
RW JD  RW JC
RW JD  RW JN
. (1.11)
Let !q CS  (qCS; qCS) denote the most cooperative equilibrium abatement-
standard vector for  S1 (SW ), i.e., qCS is the highest pollution-abatement
standard that does not invite cheating in the dynamic game with self-
interested countries. Similarly, let  !q CR  (qCR; qCR) represent the most co-
operative equilibrium abatement-standard vector of  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ).35
Clearly, qCS (qCR) is the most cooperative equilibrium abatement standard
of  S1 (SW ) ( 
R
1 (RW;w;
 !q f )) when  = SqCS ( = 
R
qCR
). Furthermore,
let us assume in the remainder of this section that  2

; 

so that both
35Observe that the most cooperative abatement-standard equilibrium is the most natural
focal point for either game as (i) it is the only equilibrium of the desired class that is
not Pareto dominated; and (ii) nothing precludes preplay communication between the
countries.
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self-interested and reciprocal countries can maintain some environmental co-
operation, but qOS is infeasible for either of them. The following proposition
compares qCR against qCS assuming that the countries are moderately de-
manding from each other regarding their environmental policy (i.e., assuming
the fair abatement standard is not too high).
Proposition 2 Let qf  qCS. Then the most cooperative equilibrium abate-
ment standard of  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ) is higher than the one of  S1 (SW ), i.e.,
qCR > qCS.
To understand Proposition 2, recall that for any cooperative abatement
standard qC above the fair abatement level qf , reciprocal countries attach
a positive weight to each others self-interested welfare, i.e., they are in
a positive-reciprocity state. Two reinforcing forces are at work here. On
the one hand, for any country J , the value of cooperation at qC is higher
in  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ) than in  S1 (SW ) because in the former game (i) the
noncooperative (punitive) Nash abatement standard is lower, increasing the
severity of punishments; and (ii) innite Nash reversion would also be costly
for country  J , which acts to heighten the cost of the punishment phase
for country J itself (see Figure 1.1). On the other hand, the static incen-
tive country J has to deviate from qC is weaker in  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ) than
in  S1 (SW ) since in the former game (i) the defect abatement standard is
higher, as the countries are in a positive-reciprocity state; and (ii) defection
would hurt  J , mitigating Js potential onetime gains from cheating (see
Figure 1.2). It then follows that reciprocal countries can more easily support
any given cooperative abatement standard above the fair one than can self-
interested countries. As a result, when the fair abatement standard is not
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too high, reciprocity has a positive impact on international environmental
cooperation (see Figure 1.3).
However, as the following proposition establishes, this is no longer nec-
essarily true when countries are highly demanding of each other regarding
pollution abatement.
Proposition 3 Let qf > qCS. Then the e¤ect of fairness and reciprocity on
the most cooperative abatement-standard equilibrium of the dynamic game is
ambiguous.
To gain some insight into Proposition 3, recall that for any cooperative abate-
ment standard qC below the fair abatement level qf , reciprocal countries at-
tach a negative weight to each others self-interested welfare, i.e., they are
in a negative-reciprocity state. Two observations can then be readily made
for any such qC < qf . On the one hand, for any country J , the value of
cooperation at qC is higher in  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ) than in  S1 (SW ) since the
punitive Nash abatement standard is lower in the former game. Of course,
innite Nash reversion would be costly for country  J as well, which acts
to lower the cost of the punishment phase for country J in  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ).
However, the latter e¤ect is relatively weak for a su¢ ciently small  (see
Figure 1.1). On the other hand, country J has a stronger incentive to de-
fect in  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ) than in  S1 (SW ) since in the former game (i) the
defect abatement standard is lower, because the countries are in a negative-
reciprocity state, willing to incur some welfare cost in order to punish each
other; and (ii) defection would hurt country  J , raising the gains from cheat-
ing for country J (see Figure 1.2). It is therefore ambiguous whether recipro-
cal or self-interested countries can more easily sustain any given cooperative
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abatement standard below the fair abatement standard. As a result, when
only very greenenvironmental policies are considered fair, the overall e¤ect
of reciprocity on international environmental cooperation could be negative
(see Figure 1.3). Actually, this is more likely to happen when  is relatively
low, i.e., when the countries are relatively impatient. This is due to the
fact that a lower  weakens the relative signicance of the stronger-incentive-
to-cooperate force, while it leaves the stronger-incentive-to-cheat force unaf-
fected. These results are more clearly illustrated in the next section within
the context of a simplied model.36
At a more general level, Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate that if, for
whatever reason, countries become more demanding of each other with re-
spect to their environmental policy (i.e., if the fair abatement standard in-
creases), a given cooperative equilibrium that could have been otherwise
supported, might no longer be feasible. This then suggests that if countries
enter a round of multilateral environmental negotiations with elevated expec-
tations due to domestic and/or global political pressure, they might fail to
reach an agreement on deeper international environmental cooperation, even
though such an agreement might have been attainable in the absence of these
high expectations. Therefore, Propositions 2 and 3 provide a novel perspec-
tive on the successes and failures of international environmental negotiations,
as at the Cancun and the Copenhagen summits, respectively.
36At this point, we should note that asymmetries in fair-abatement-standard perceptions
would not a¤ect the qualitative nature of our ndings as long as the countries remained
symmetrically demanding of each other with respect to their environmental policy. In
particular, under asymmetric fair-abatement-standard perceptions, Proposition 2 would
still hold as long as q Jf  q
 J
CS for any country J , whereas Proposition 3 would still be
valid as long as q Jf > q
 J
CS for all J .
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1.5 Simplied Model
In this section we reproduce the results of the paper within a simple setup
with linear demand curves and a specic functional form for wJ(q J ; qf ).
This enables us to better illustrate the insights from our model. To this end,
let the demand for good j in country J be given by:
D
 
P Jj

=   P Jj , (1.12)
where  > 1=2;  > 0 are constants. Moreover, let us assume that the weight
function wJ is of the following form:
wJ(q J ; qf ) =
q J   qf
q J + qf
2 [ 1; 1) . (1.13)
We rst look at the static game, and in particular at  S(SW ). The
abatement standard that would prevail under full international cooperation
equals:
qOS = 1 
2
1 + 2 (1 + s)2
. (1.14)
We next derive the best-response abatement standard of country J :
BRJS(q
 J) =
3 + 4
 
1 +
 
1  q J

s

  4
3 + 4
. (1.15)
From equation (1.15), the self-interested static Nash abatement standard can
then be readily obtained:
qNS = 1 
4
3 + 4 (1 + s)
. (1.16)
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As discussed above, the Nash equilibrium of  S(SW ) is characterized by an
ine¢ ciently low level of pollution abatement (i.e., qOS > qNS) as long as the
degree of transboundary pollution s is large enough, or:
 >
1
4s (1 + s)
. (1.17)
The analysis for  R(RW;w; !q f ), however, is more involved. The best-
response function for reciprocal country J is given by:
BRJR
 
q J

= f 4
 
q J + qf

+
 
q J + qf
 
3 + 4
 
1 +
 
1  q J

s

 
 
q J   qf
 
1  4s
 
1  q J + s

g, (1.18)
where  = 1=

(3 + 4)
 
q J + qf

+
 
q J   qf

(4s2   1) 

. For the re-
mainder of this section, we resort to numerical/graphical analysis since the
functional forms are too cumbersome for analytical results.37 Numerical
analysis shows that qNR < qNS when qf > qNS, qNR = qNS when qf = qNS,
and @qNR=@qf < 0, conrming Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
We now turn to the dynamic game and compare qCS with qCR, while main-
taining the (nonrestrictive) assumptions that qf > qNS and qC 2 (qNS; qOS].
Let us consider rst the per-period value of cooperation for country J in
 R1(RW;w;
 !q f ) and  S1(SW ): !JR and !JS, respectively. Figure 1.1 depicts
the relationship between the two: !JR > !
J
S for any qC 2 (qNS; qOS]. In-
tuitively, two forces are at work here. First, the punitive Nash abatement
standard is lower in  R1(RW;w;
 !q f ) than in  S1(SW ), i.e., qNR < qNS. Sec-
37The analysis was carried out using Mathematica. The le is available from the authors
upon request.
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ond, innite Nash reversion would also hurt Js partner. This could raise or
lower the cost of the punishment phase for country J itself in  R1(RW;w;
 !q f ),
depending on whether the countries are in a positive- or negative-reciprocity
state, i.e., depending on whether qC is above or below qf . In any case, for
su¢ ciently low , this e¤ect is relatively weak and is always dominated by
the rst e¤ect.
Figure 1.1: Incentive to Cooperate
We next examine the static incentive country J has to cheat in
 R1(RW;w;
 !q f ) and  S1(SW ): 
JR and 
JS, correspondingly. As Figure 1.2
reveals, the former is weaker if and only if qC > qf . The intuition is direct.
For any given qC above qf , the countries are in a positive-reciprocity state.
This has a dampening e¤ect on the defect abatement standard. Moreover,
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defection would be costly for Js partner, which acts to mitigate the potential
onetime gains from cheating for J in  R1(RW;w;
 !q f ). As a result, 
JR < 
JS
for any such qC . Of course, the reverse is true for cooperative abatement
standards below the fair abatement level, i.e., 
JR > 

J
S for qC < qf .
Figure 1.2: Incentive to Deviate
Therefore, for qf 2 (qNS; qCS], reciprocal countries have a stronger incen-
tive to cooperate and a weaker incentive to defect than self-interested coun-
tries around qCS, implying that the former can support greener policies
than the latter, or qCR > qCS. However, for qf > qCS, reciprocal countries
have around qCS both a stronger incentive to cheat and a stronger incentive
to cooperate than self-interested ones. In other words, there are two o¤set-
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ting forces at play for high fair-abatement-standard perceptions, making the
comparison between qCS and qCR less clear-cut. Our simulations do conrm
that for very high fair abatement standards, qCR does indeed lie below qCS,
as we depict in Figure 1.3. To summarize, when countries are highly de-
manding from each other regarding their environmental policies, reciprocity
could have a detrimental e¤ect on international environmental cooperation.
Figure 1.3: Most Cooperative Abatement Standard
1.6 Endogenizing Fairness
We have hitherto assumed that perceptions of fairness are exogenous and con-
stant between periods. This is consistent with the experimental work of Fehr
and Falk (1999), who in a wage-setting context nd virtually no change in ei-
ther behavior or perceptions of fairness over time. However, one could argue
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that countriesperceptions of a fair abatement standard might adjust during
the course of the game. As Kahneman et al. (1986, pp.7301) write: Psy-
chological studies of adaptation suggest that any stable state of a¤airs tends
to become accepted eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no
longer readily come to mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as un-
fair may in time acquire the status of a reference transaction...[people] adapt
their views of fairness to the norms of actual behavior.38 In this section, we
extend our analysis by allowing for endogenous formation of fair-abatement-
standard perceptions, and investigate whether our main predictions so far
continue to hold.
To this end, we adapt to our discrete-time framework an equation widely
used in the habit formation literature (e.g., Ryder and Heal, 1973; Carroll et
al., 2000; Fuhrer, 2000), assuming that current abatement standards a¤ect
future fair-abatement-standard perceptions as follows:
q J;tf = q
 J;t 1 + (1  ) q J;t 1f , for any J , (1.19)
where  2 (0; 1). Equation (1.19) indicates that country Js fair-abatement-
standard perception today is a linear combination of its last periods fair-
abatement-standard perception and of the abatement standard country  J
actually implemented in that period. In other words, if country  J sets an
abatement standard today above the one country J deems fair, then country
J will be more demanding in the next period (i.e., q Jf increases), which acts
to lower its fairness payo¤ for any given q J . On the other hand, if country
38See Franciosi et al. (1995) for experimental support of these ideas in a price-setting
context.
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 J selects an abatement standard today below q Jf , then country J will be
less demanding in the next period (i.e., q Jf decreases), which acts to raise
its fairness payo¤ given a q J .39 It follows that as the game unfolds, country
Js fair-abatement-level perception converges to  Js actual environmental
policy. More formally: q J;tf   q J;t !t!1 0. (1.20)
We are now prepared to examine whether our main conclusions heretofore
are a¤ected in any fundamental way by (1.19). Let us make the assumption
that  is not too big (i.e., countries do not adjust their reference levels too
quickly). Clearly, endogenizing fairness has no impact on the static game.
At the same time, in the dynamic game, the major di¤erence equation (1.19)
introduces is that both qNR and qCR vary over time. However, given an
 and an initial fair-abatement-level perception, we can readily derive the
future fair-abatement-standard perceptions, and hence qtNR and q
t
CR for all t.
It is direct to show that if the fair abatement level is initially below the
most cooperative equilibrium abatement standard of the self-interested game,
then qCR remains above qCS along the equilibrium path, which is along the
lines of Proposition 2. Intuitively, under this scenario, the countries start
with a qCR above qCS. As the game progresses, qf converges to qCR, and
thus, qCR converges to qCS (since wJ converges to zero). But for an  that
is not too high, qf never exceeds qCS (implying that qCS never exceeds qCR
39It is only reasonable to assume that as international environmental cooperation be-
comes stronger, countries become more demanding with respect to environmental policy.
For example, it is logical to expect that the abatement standards deemed fair nowadays are
substantially higher compared with those in the 1970s or 1980s, when global warming did
not occupy center stage in the policy arena and international environmental cooperation
was substantially weaker.
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by Proposition 2).
Moreover, a result analogous to Proposition 3 is obtained: If the fair
abatement standard is initially higher than qCS, then the e¤ect of fairness
and reciprocity on multilateral tari¤ cooperation is ambiguous, since the
countries might start with a qCR either below or above qCS. Eventually
though, under this scenario as well, the reciprocal game (slowly) converges
to the self-interested one. In summary, allowing for endogenously formed
fair-abatement-standard perceptions does not a¤ect the qualitative nature of
our ndings (as long as  is not too high).
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we examined the impact of fairness and reciprocity on inter-
national environmental cooperation in pollution abatement, where pollution
was assumed to be transboundary in nature. More specically, we investi-
gated whether in the context of self-enforcing IEAs (involving full participa-
tion) reciprocal countries can support a higher degree of pollution abatement
than self-interested ones. In our setting, a reciprocal country is willing to re-
ward another country by raising its own abatement standard and therefore
reducing transboundary pollution if it expects the latter to behave kindly by
setting a higher abatement standard than the one deemed fair; nevertheless,
the reverse is true when the latter is expected to behave unkindly by imple-
menting an unfairly low level of pollution abatement. This is an important
question for two reasons. First, governments and individuals seem to exhibit
reciprocal preferences towards environmental policy. Second, our analysis
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provides a novel perspective on the successes and failures of international
environmental negotiations.
We have established that reciprocal countries that have moderate ex-
pectations from each other regarding their national abatement policies (i.e.,
when their fair-abatement-standard perceptions are not too high) can sustain
higher cooperative abatement levels than self-interested ones. On the other
hand, when countries are highly demanding from each other with respect
to environmental policy (i.e., when only very high abatement standards are
perceived as fair), then reciprocity could have a detrimental e¤ect on interna-
tional environmental cooperation. Our ndings therefore suggest a plausible
explanation for the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen summit and the suc-
cess of the 2010 Cancun one. In particular, it is now evident that countries
entered the Copenhagen negotiations with overly ambitious expectations.
Our analysis demonstrates that such high expectations (represented in our
framework by high fair-abatement-standard perceptions) could prove to be
counterproductive, hindering the e¤orts for deeper international environmen-
tal cooperation. The opposite is true for the Cancun summit. Expectations
were much more modest and the outcome was surprisingly positive.
In concluding, a remark is in order. We focused here on symmetric coun-
tries, and argued that introducing asymmetries of a not too high degree in
their fair-abatement-standard perceptions would not a¤ect the qualitative
nature of our ndings. It would be interesting, though, to incorporate into
our framework further (and larger) asymmetries among countries (e.g., in
their size or their production structure). Such a model would provide us
with valuable insights into the implications of fairness and reciprocity for
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North-South environmental cooperation. We leave this avenue for future
research.
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Appendix 1.A Proofs
Lemma 2: For the static game with reciprocal countries  R(RW;w; !q f ),
there exist largest and smallest pure symmetric Nash equilibria,
 !
q NR 
(qNR; qNR) and
 !q NR 

q
NR
; q
NR

. Similarly, for the static game with
self-interested countries  S(SW ), there also exist largest and smallest pure
symmetric Nash equilibria,
 !
q NS  (qNS; qNS) and  !q NS 

q
NS
; q
NS

.
Moreover, if the countriesbest-response functions have a slope strictly greater
than  1, then  R(RW;w; !q f ) and  S(SW ) have unique equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 2: We rst consider  R(RW;w; !q f ). Let us dene new
strategies aJ = qJ and a J =  q J , reversing the natural order in coun-
try  Js strategy set. Then, @RWJ
@aJ@a J > 0. Given now that the number of
countries is two and that for any country J (i) [0; qJOR] is a compact inter-
val in R+; (ii) RW J is twice continuously di¤erentiable on [0; qJOR]; and (iii)
@RWJ
@aJ@a J > 0, we know from Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) that
 R(RW;w; !q f ) is a (smooth strictly) supermodular game. It then follows
from Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) that (i) there exist largest
and smallest serially undominated strategies for each country J , qJ and qJ ;
and (ii) the strategy proles
 !
q 
 
qJ ; q J

and  !q 
 
qJ ; q J

are pure
Nash equilibrium proles. Finally, given the overall symmetry of our setup,
we have that qJNR = q
 J
NR  qNR and qJNR = q
 J
NR
 q
NR
.
The second part of the lemma is straightforward upon recalling that
 S(SW ) can be obtained from  R(RW;w; !q f ) by setting  = 0, mean-
ing that  S(SW ) is also a (smooth strictly) supermodular game. Last, the
uniqueness of the equilibria when the countriesbest-response functions have
a slope strictly greater than  1 follows directly from Theorem 2.8 in Vives
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(1999). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: Given that (i)  R(RW;w; !q f ) is a supermodular game;
and (ii) @RW
J
@qJ@qf
< 0 for any J , the lemma follows immediately from Theorem
6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: If qf = qNS, then trivially qNR = qNS  qN ,
implying that for any J , RW J( !q N ; ef ) = SW J( !q N) since wJ(qN ; qf ) = 0
by (1.5). On the other hand, if qf > qNS, then qNR < qNS by Lemma 1. These
two inequalities imply that qNR < qf , and thus for any J , wJ(qNR; qf ) < 0
from (1.5). Moreover, for qNR < qNS, SW J(
 !q NR) < SW J( !q NS) for all J .
But then it follows that for all J , RW J( !q NR; qf ) < SW J( !q NS). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We rst prove the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 3: Let qC  qf be a cooperative abatement standard. The critical
discount factor above which international environmental cooperation can be
maintained at qC is lower in  R1 (RW;w;
 !q f ) than in  S1 (SW ), i.e., RqC <
SqC .
Proof of Lemma 3: We want to show that qC  qf implies that RqC =
RWJD RWJC
RWJD RWJN
<
SWJD SWJC
SWJD SWJN
= SqC . To do so, we will prove:
(i) If qC  qf ) RW JD  RW JC  SW JD   SW JC for any J .
(ii) If qC  qf ) RW JD  RW JN > SW JD   SW JN for any J .
Let us start with (i). We have that for any J :
RW JC = SW
J( !q C) + wJ(qC ; qf )SW J( !q C) and
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RW JD = SW
J(BRJR(qC); qC) + w
J(qC ; qf )SW
 J(BRJR(qC); qC).
Therefore:
RW JD  RW JC = SW J(BRJR(qC); qC)  SW J( !q C)
+wJ(qC ; qf )
 
SW J(BRJR(qC); qC)  SW J( !q C)

(1.21)
 SW J(BRJR(qC); qC)  SW J( !q C)
 SW J(BRJS(qC); qC)  SW J( !q C) = SW JD   SW JC .
We know from (1.5) that wJ(qC ; qf )  0 if qC  qf . Furthermore, the
welfare of self-interested country  J is (weakly) lower when country J de-
viates while it still cooperates than when both countries cooperate, i.e.,
SW J(BRJR(qC); qC)   SW J( !q C)  0. The rst inequality then follows.
The second inequality stems from the fact that BRJS(qC) is the best reply of
the self-interested country J . This concludes the proof of (i).
We now turn to (ii). Let us rewrite the result we want to show:
qC  qf )
 
RW JD   SW JD

 
 
RW JN   SW JN

> 0 for any J .
By Proposition 1 we know that the Nash equilibrium abatement level of
 S(SW ) is (weakly) higher than that of  R(RW;w; !q f ), i.e., qNR  qNS.
Thus, qf  qNS  qNR, implying that wJ(qNR; qf )  0 by (1.5). Therefore,
the following inequality holds for any J :
RW JN = SW
J( !q NR) + wJ(qNR; qf )SW J( !q NR) (1.22)
 SW J( !q NR)  SW J( !q NS) = SW JN .
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Next we will show that RW JD   SW JD  0 for any J . Remember that  is
assumed to be su¢ ciently small. Taking a rst-order Taylor series expansion
of RW J(BRJR(qC); qC ; qf ) around  = 0, we obtain:
RW J(BRJR(qC); qC ; qf )  SW J(BRJS(qC); qC)+
+wJ(qC ; qf )SW
 J(BRJS(qC); qC),
, RW J(BRJR(qC); qC ; qf )  SW J(BRJS(qC); qC) 
 wJ(qC ; qf )SW J(BRJS(qC); qC)  0, (1.23)
, RW JD   SW JD  0.
The inequality holds due to wJ(qC ; qf )  0. By assumption, we have that
qC > qNS, and thus qf cannot be equal to both qC and qNS at the same time.
Hence, at least one of the inequalities in (1.22) and (1.23) must be strict.
This concludes the proof of part (ii). Therefore, by (i) and (ii), we nally
have RqC < 
S
qC
. Q.E.D.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 2. We know from Lemma 3 that
for any cooperative abatement standard qC  qf , RqC < 
S
qC
. So, given the
assumption of Proposition 2 (i.e., qCS  qf), this is also true for the most
cooperative equilibrium abatement standard of the repeated game with self-
interested countries, qCS: 
R
qCS
< SqCS . Note that both self-interested and
reciprocal countries can sustain qCS at the discount factor 
S
qCS
, but only
reciprocal countries can support qCS at 
R
qCS
. From (1.9) and (1.11), we have:
SW JD   SW JC = SqCS
 
SW JD   SW JN

and
RW JD  RW JC = RqCS
 
RW JD  RW JN

.
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Since RqCS < 
S
qCS
:
RW JD  RW JC < SqCS
 
RW JD  RW JN

,
,
 
1  SqCS

RW J(BRJR(qCS); qCS; qf )
< RW J( !q CS; qf )  SqCSRW
J ( !q NR; qf ) , (1.24)
meaning that 
JR (qCS) <
SqCS
1 SqCS
!JR (qCS), or that the incentive-compatibility
condition is not binding for a reciprocal country J at the pair (qCS; 
S
qCS
).
Note here that RW JN does not depend on the cooperative abatement level.
Moreover, for any cooperative abatement standard qC higher than the most
cooperative equilibrium abatement level of  s1(SW ), qCS, the welfare for
reciprocal country J under defection from qC is higher than the welfare under
deviation from qCS:
RW J(BRJR(qC); qC ; qf ) > RW
J(BRJR(qCS); qCS; qf ).
At the same time, for such a qC > qCS, country Js welfare under cooperation
is also higher at qC than at qCS:
RW J( !q C ; qf ) > RW J( !q CS; qf ).
By the continuity of RW J(), there exists a cooperative abatement bqC > qCS
such that (1.24) still holds, or 
JR (bqC) < SqCS1 SqCS !JR (bqC). Since the same
analysis applies to any (qCS; 
S
qCS
) pair for SqCS 2 [; ], we have that for any
 2 [; ], qCS < qCR. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Lemma 3 holds for any cooperative abatement
standard qC (weakly) higher than the fair abatement level qf . However, for
any qC < qf , it is ambiguous by (1.21) and (1.23) whether 
R
qC
or SqC is higher,
since the weight function is negative at qC . Hence, it is possible that the
minimum discount factor required for countries with reciprocal preferences to
sustain cooperation at qC is higher than that for self-interested countries, i.e.,
RqC > 
S
qC
. Let us consider this case rst, and focus on the most cooperative
equilibrium abatement standard of  s1(SW ), qCS. Under the scenario in
question, both types of countries could sustain cooperation at qCS only with
a level of discount factor equal to RqCS or above. Moreover, let us make
the assumption that 
JR () is a strictly convex function whereas !JR () is a
strictly concave one.40 From (1.11) and (1.9), we have:
RW JD  RW JC = RqCS
 
RW JD  RW JN

and
SW JD   SW JC = SqCS
 
SW JD   SW JN

.
Since RqCS > 
S
qCS
:
RW JD  RW JC > SqCS
 
RW JD  RW JN

,
,
 
1  SqCS

RW J(BRJR(qCS); qCS;qf )
> RW J( !q CS; qf )  SqCSRW
J ( !q NR; qf ) ,
meaning that 
JR (qCS) >
SqCS
1 SqCS
!JR (qCS), or that the incentive-compatibility
condition is violated for a reciprocal country J at the pair (qCS; 
S
qCS
).
40This assumption is clearly not restrictive given the type of result we are seeking here.
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For any cooperative abatement standard qC lower (higher) than the most
cooperative equilibrium abatement standard of  s1(SW ), qCS, the onetime
gain for reciprocal country J under defection from qC is lower (higher) than
the static gain under deviation from qCS:

JR (qC) < (>)

J
R (qCS) .
At the same time, for such a qC < (>)qCS, country Js per-period gain from
cooperation is also lower (higher) at qC than at qCS:
!JR (qC) < (>)!
J
R (qCS) .
Given the strict convexity of 
JR () and the strict concavity of !JR (), it
follows that the incentive-compatibility condition for reciprocal country J
can only be restored at a cooperative abatement standard bqC < qCS. Since
the same analysis applies to any (qCS; 
S
qCS
) pair for SqCS 2 [; ], we have
that for any  2 [; ], qCS > qCR.
Nevertheless, RqCS < 
S
qCS
is also possible by (1.21) and (1.23). In this
case, as we showed in the proof of Proposition 2, qCS < qCR. Therefore, when
qf > qCS, it is ambiguous whether qCR or qCS is higher due to the ambiguity
of whether RqCS or 
S
qCS
is higher. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 2
Multilateral Tari¤ Cooperation
under Fairness and Reciprocity
This paper explores the impact of fairness and reciprocity on multilateral
tari¤ cooperation. Reciprocal countries reward kind behavior (positive reci-
procity), but retaliate against countries behaving unkindly (negative reci-
procity). We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that are moderately de-
manding from their trading partners regarding their commercial policy can
support a greater degree of cooperation than self-interested ones. However,
when only very liberal import policies are considered fair, then reciprocity
could have a detrimental e¤ect on multilateral tari¤ cooperation. Thus, our
model provides a novel reason for the occasional failure of trade negotiations.
Finally, we show that these results are robust to endogenizing fair-tari¤ per-
ceptions.
Keywords: Reciprocity; Trade agreements; Trade policy; Repeated games
JEL Classication: F13; D63
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2.1 Introduction
"We wish to do it [promote commerce] by throwing open all
the doors of commerce and knocking o¤ all its shackles. But as
this cannot be done for others, unless they will do it for us, and
there is no probability that Europe will do this, I suppose we may
obliged to adopt a system which may shackle them in our ports,
as they do to us in theirs." Thomas Je¤erson, 17851
Reciprocity is an old theme in international trade negotiations. In this
paper, we set out to explore the implications of reciprocal preferences for
commercial policy and multilateral trade agreements. Governments with
reciprocal preferences reward "kind" or "fair" actions (positive reciprocity),
whereas they punish "unkind" or "unfair" behavior (negative reciprocity).
This is an important question for two reasons. First, governments seem to
exhibit such preferences, at least with respect to trade policy. Second, our
analysis provides a novel perspective on the successes and the occasional
failures of multilateral trade negotiations. We should stress here that our
denition of "reciprocity" di¤ers substantially from the standard one in the
trade literature (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a; Freund, 2003; Krishna
and Mitra, 2005). In these papers, the term "reciprocity" refers broadly
to mutual changes in trade policy by self-interested countries which bring
about changes in each countrys import volume that are of equal value to
the changes in its export volume. Instead, in our framework, reciprocity
characterizes the preferences of countries.
1PTJ 8: 633.
44
CHAPTER 2. MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION UNDER
FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY
Most governments specically state that one of their major goals when
sitting at the negotiations table is to promote fair trade through reciprocity,
with "fair trade" typically entailing that (i) domestic producers (and work-
ers) are faced with fair trade policies worldwide; and (ii) the gains from
trade are fairly distributed among trading partners. For instance, President
Obamas 2009 Trade Policy Agenda Report states that "If we work together,
free and fair trade...will be a powerful contributor to the national and global
well being."2 Analogous goals and concerns characterize the commercial pol-
icy of the European Union (EU). On its o¢ cial website on external trade,
it is written that "The EU has evolved during the process of globalization
by aiming for the harmonious development of world trade and fostering fair-
ness..."3 At the same time, the emphasis placed on reciprocity is equally
strong. For example, President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel in a joint
letter to the President of the EU Council in 2007 argue that "Open mar-
kets can only develop their full potential if transparent rules facilitate fair
competition in a spirit of reciprocity."4 Moreover, a 2006 Communication of
the EU Commission warns that "If necessary, targeted restrictions will be
maintained [on behalf of the EU] for uncooperative countries with the aim of
encouraging them towards a mutual opening up of markets."5 Another such
example of negative reciprocity is the extensive employment of anti-dumping
and countervailing measures within the context of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), aimed directly at punishing unfair trade practices. In brief,
2See http://www.ustr.gov/node/4442.
3See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_trade/index_en.htm.
4"Reinforcing the Lisbon Strategy through External Economic Measures," French Pres-
idency/German Chancellors O¢ ce, September 10, 2007.
5See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_trade/r11022_en.htm.
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in the international trade arena, governments seem, to some extent, to not
be simply maximizers of their own self-interested welfare, but to rather be
exhibiting some preferences for fairness and reciprocity.
It could also be argued that it is reasonable to expect governments to
have reciprocal preferences towards commercial policy since such preferences
are exhibited by voters.6 In experiments, there is ample evidence of both pos-
itive and negative reciprocity in individual decision making.7 Public opinion
polls suggest that a signicant proportion of people do exhibit reciprocal
preferences with respect to trade policy as well. For example, in a January
2004 PIPA poll, 67% of Americans agreed that "in general, if another coun-
try is willing to lower its barriers to products from the US if we [the US]
will lower our [its] barriers to their products," the US should do so, whereas
only 24% disagreed with this statement. More importantly, almost 75% of
the ones endorsing this statement agreed that "the US should only lower
its barriers if other countries do, because that is the only way to pressure
them to open their markets," while just 24% of them thought that "the US
6In fact, one could argue that governments are not genuinely motivated by fairness
considerations, but only push for fairer trade policies in order to increase their political
support, since voters have such considerations. In any case, our results depend solely on
governments exhibiting, to some degree, reciprocal preferences towards commercial policy,
and not on why this is the case.
7For instance, experiments asking individuals to contribute to public goods typically
nd that their contributions far exceed what self-interested utility maximization would
entail (e.g., Andreoni, 1988; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; Croson, 2007). This is usually
interpreted as evidence of positive reciprocity. Analogous results arise from trust or gift-
exchange experiments (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr et al., 1998). On
the other hand, evidence for negative reciprocity is found in ultimatum-game experiments
with the typical result being that people reject o¤ers that would be accepted under the
self-interested hypothesis (e.g., Güth et al., 1982; Roth et al., 1991). Moreover, in a recent
paper, Dohmen et al. (2009) provide evidence of both positive and negative reciprocity
using survey data.
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should lower its barriers even if other countries do not, because consumers
can buy cheaper imports and foreign competition spurs American companies
to be more e¢ cient."8 Similar preferences towards commercial policy are ex-
hibited by Europeans. In a spring 2001 Eurobarometer survey, more than
74% of EU-15 citizens did endorse reciprocity in international trade agree-
ments, whereas merely 7% of them did not.9 Another important conclusion
that could be drawn from these polls is that people have an explicit notion
of what fair trade involves, i.e., they have a reference level regarding fair
commercial policy against which the policies implemented by their own gov-
ernment or by the rest of the world can be evaluated.10 For instance, in a
July 2004 CCFR poll, Americans were asked whether the US practices fair
trade with various other countries, and whether the countries in question
have fair trade policies towards the US. The percentage of respondents who
were not sure/declined to answer was very low overall, ranging from 11% to
14% in the former case and from 11% to 15% in the latter.11 Likewise, in
a 19-nation poll conducted November 2003 through February 2004, people
around the globe were asked whether rich countries are playing fair in trade
negotiations with poor countries. In this poll, the percentage of respondents
who were not sure/declined to answer was just 10% or lower in 14 out of the
19 countries.12
8See http://americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/tradepolicy.cfm.
9See (in French) http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_152_fr.pdf.
10The "reference level" is a concept widely studied in the behavioral economics literature.
For more on this, see, for instance, Helson (1964) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991).
11See http://americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/reservations_trade
.cfm.
12See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jun03/GlobalIss_Jun04_quaire.p
df.
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On a more theoretical level, if individuals have reciprocal preferences,
political-economy models of trade policy suggest that these preferences will
be reected in the governments objective function. The rst model we can
invoke here is the median-voter model, where the government chooses poli-
cies that reect majority opinion on the issue (in order to remain popular
and stay elected).13 In such a setting, if the median voter has reciprocal pref-
erences, then the governments actions are going to mirror these preferences.
Instead, we could look at interest-group models. The framework that cur-
rently occupies center stage in the literature is due to Grossman and Helpman
(1994). In their paper, the incumbent government maximizes a weighted av-
erage of aggregate social welfare and political contributions by lobbies that
wish to inuence trade policy. Alternatively, political inuences could be
readily represented, as Baldwin (1987) has demonstrated, by a parameter
that attaches additional weight to producer surplus in the governments ob-
jective function. In either case, if individuals have preferences for fairness
and reciprocity, these preferences will enter into the governments objective
function with some weight.14
To address the implications of reciprocity and fairness for commercial
policy, we develop a dynamic game in which reciprocal countries facing a
terms-of-trade Prisoners Dilemma problem in their dealings with one an-
other attempt to maintain tari¤ cooperation. To model reciprocity, we follow
Segal and Sobel (2007). In particular, we assume that a country attaches a
positive (negative) weight to the self-interested welfare of a trading partner
13See, for example, Mayer (1984).
14See Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) for US
empirical evidence that social welfare does in fact receive a high weight in the governments
objective function.
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if it expects the latter to behave kindly (unkindly) by imposing an import
tari¤ that is lower (higher) than the one it perceives as fair. In other words,
countries are assumed to have preferences over both outcomes and strategies.
Of course, fairer tari¤ policies correspond to a fairer distribution of the gains
from trade among countries (or interest groups in di¤erent countries), mean-
ing that our results could be readily reinterpreted in terms of the distribution
of the trade gains among trading partners. Besides the countriesreciprocal
preferences, we model trade agreements in a standard fashion. More specif-
ically, we maintain the assumption that binding commitments cannot be
made at the international level and countries are therefore limited to cooper-
ative multilateral tari¤ agreements that are self-enforcing. This assumption
reects the lack of a strong mechanism within the WTO for enforcing the
trade policies agreed upon under its auspices. In this context, a country will
choose today to adhere to the cooperative path as long as the onetime gain
it could achieve by unilaterally deviating from its agreed-upon trade policies
does not outweigh the discounted welfare cost of the future trade war its
defection would ignite.15
We nd that reciprocal countries that are moderately demanding from
their trading partners with respect to their commercial policy (i.e., when the
tari¤s considered fair are not too low, but at the same time, overly restrictive
import policies are perceived as unfair) can support a greater degree of multi-
lateral tari¤ cooperation and thus achieve higher welfare than self-interested
ones. The intuition is straightforward. For such fair-tari¤ perceptions, in
the reciprocal game (i) the punitive Nash tari¤s are higher than in the self-
15See, for example, Dam (1970), Dixit (1987), and Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for further
elaboration on these points.
49
CHAPTER 2. MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION UNDER
FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY
interested one; and (ii) the countries are in a positive-reciprocity state. As a
result, under the scenario in question, reciprocal countries face both a weaker
incentive to defect and a stronger incentive to cooperate than self-interested
ones, allowing them to maintain more liberal trade policies.
However, when reciprocal countries are highly demanding from their trad-
ing partners regarding their import policy (i.e., when only very liberal im-
port policies are considered fair), then the e¤ect of reciprocity on multilateral
trade cooperation is ambiguous. Intuitively, in such a case, reciprocal coun-
tries are in a negative-reciprocity state, meaning that they face a stronger
incentive to cheat than self-interested ones, even though their incentive to
cooperate is still relatively stronger due to the harsher punishment a defec-
tor faces in the reciprocal game. Our simulations do conrm that for very
low fair tari¤s, there are indeed cases where self-interested countries can sup-
port lower cooperative tari¤s in equilibrium than reciprocal ones. Finally, we
demonstrate that our results are robust to allowing for fair-tari¤ perceptions
that are endogenously determined during the course of the game.
At this point, it is important to note that our ndings suggest a novel
reason for the occasional failure of trade negotiations: Assuming countries
have (some) preferences for fairness and reciprocity, if they arrive at the nego-
tiating table with expectations that are highly elevated (i.e., they have very
low fair-tari¤ perceptions), this could prove counterproductive, in the sense
that they might no longer be able to support very liberal trade policies. As
a matter of fact, Mr. Renato Ruggiero, the WTO Director-General in 1995-
1999, referred to this possibility in one of his speeches in 1995: "I have heard
it said that unrealistically high expectations could pose a threat to the suc-
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cess of the negotiations. I have also heard it suggested that failure to meet
such expectations could make a multilateral solution impossible."16 It could
then be argued that this might be one of the possible explanations for the
problems plaguing the Doha Round since its launch in 2001. More speci-
cally, the success of the 1986-94 Uruguay Round as well as the deepening of
globalization in general in the 1990s might have led to countries entering the
Doha negotiations with expectations that were too high, hindering the e¤orts
for further multilateral trade liberalization. Put di¤erently, if countries had
entered the Doha Round with lower expectations, its outcome might have
been more favorable. Another plausible explanation, still along the lines of
our model, is that developing countries might have arrived at the negotia-
tions being too demanding from developed countries regarding their trade
policies (especially with respect to agricultural goods), partly due to their
feeling that the previous round was lopsided or unfair.17 In any case, as Dani
Rodrik writes: "In the end, it may well be the atmospherics psychology and
expectations rather than the actual economic results on the ground that
will determine the outcomes [of the Doha Round]."18 In summary, expecta-
tions emerge as a key factor in our analysis, having a signicant e¤ect on
what can be achieved in the international trade arena. In fact, to the best of
our knowledge, our paper is the rst to identify such a role for expectations
in international trade negotiations. The policy implications of our model
are then straightforward. The careful management of expectations is criti-
16See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres95_e/pr9512_e.htm.
17For more on the latter explanation, see "The Doha Round...and Round...and Round,"
The Economist (print edition), July 31, 2008.
18See http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/08/wto.internationalaidan
ddevelopment.
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cal for the success of multilateral trade negotiations, and most importantly,
the creation of a pre-negotiations high-expectations environment should be
avoided.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out
the basics. Section 3 characterizes the static Nash equilibrium of our model,
whereas Section 4 analyzes the dynamic game. Section 5 presents a simpli-
ed model in order to better illustrate the main insights from our analysis.
Section 6 endogenizes countries fair-tari¤ perceptions. Finally, Section 7
identies some promising avenues for future research and concludes. All the
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
We assume the world consists of two countries, A and B, that trade two
goods, a and b.19 This focus on a 2-country world is nonrestrictive, as our
ndings readily extend to N countries.20 Country J is endowed with 1 unit
of good  j and zero units of good j, where J 2 fA;Bg and j 2 fa; bg.21 On
the consumption side, we maintain the assumptions that demand functions
are symmetric across countries and goods, and that the demand for good j is
independent of the price of good  j. More specically, the demand for good
j in country J is given by D
 
P Jj

, where P Jj is good js price in country J .
We make the standard assumptions that D
 
P Jj

is strictly positive on some
19Our framework is inspired by Bagwell and Staiger (1999b).
20Upon request, a technical appendix is available from the authors in which an N -
country model is presented.
21We choose to ignore the production process in the two countries for expositional
simplicity. In any case, this assumption does not a¤ect the qualitative nature of our
ndings.
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bounded interval
h
0; P
J
j

, that D
 
P Jj

= 0 for P Jj  P
J
j , and that D
 
P Jj

is
twice continuously di¤erentiable in P Jj with D
0  P Jj  < 0 for P Jj 2 h0; P Jj .
Given our setup, country J imports good j, whereas it exports good  j in
accordance with the following export supply function:
XJ j
 
P J j

= 1 D
 
P J j

. (2.1)
In each period, the countries simultaneously select specic (nonprohibitive)
import tari¤s so as to maximize their individual welfare. The tari¤s are
picked with perfect information as to all past tari¤ choices. Let country
Js import tari¤ be J 2 J  R+, where J is a compact interval. The
no-arbitrage condition for good j yields:
P Jj = P
 J
j + 
J . (2.2)
The equilibrium prices can then be obtained from the usual market-clearing
conditions:
D
 
P Jj
 
J

= X Jj
 
P Jj
 
J

. (2.3)
The countries are assumed to have preferences for fairness and reciprocity.
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In particular, the welfare of country J is given by:22
RW J
 
J ;  J ;  Jf

= SW J
 
J ;  J

+ wJ( J ;  Jf )SW
 J  J ;  J .
(2.4)
The rst term, SW J , is the self-interested (or "standard") welfare function,
i.e., the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ revenue:
SW J
 
J ;  J

=
Z PJj
PJj (
J )
D (P ) dP +
Z PJ j
PJ j(
 J )
D (P ) dP + (2.5)
+ P J j
 J + JX Jj
 
J

.
The second term, wJ( J ;  Jf )SW
 J , captures the fairness payo¤ for coun-
try J , where (i) its relative signicance is specied by the scaling factor   0;
and (ii) wJ( J ;  Jf ) determines the weight country J places on its trading
partners self-interested welfare SW J , and is of the following form:
wJ( J ;  Jf )
8>>><>>>:
> 0 if  Jf > 
 J
= 0 if  J =  Jf
< 0 otherwise
, (2.6)
with  Jf being the 
 J country J deems "fair." We maintain the assump-
tions that country Js weight function wJ( J ;  Jf ) is twice continuously
di¤erentiable in both arguments, and is nondecreasing in its own fair-tari¤
22An alternative way of modeling reciprocity in a dynamic setup is due to Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004). In their paper, they develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive
form games, and introduce a new solution concept  sequential reciprocity equilibrium
where players update their beliefs about their co-players intentions as the game un-
folds and choose their actions accordingly. However, their framework would be highly
intractable for the purposes of this paper.
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perception and nonincreasing in country Js tari¤. Furthermore, we assume
that fair-tari¤ perceptions are common knowledge.
Intuitively, the function wJ reects the fact that a reciprocal country
cares about the intentions of its trading partner. More specically, the rst
condition in (2.6) expresses positive reciprocity: If country J expects the
tari¤ of country  J to be smaller than its own perception of a fair tari¤,
then it is willing to sacrice some of its self-interested welfare to reward its
trading partner. On the other hand, the third condition in (2.6) expresses
negative reciprocity: When country J expects country  J to impose a tari¤
that exceeds the one it perceives as fair, then it wishes to punish its trading
partner and is willing to sacrice some of its own self-interested welfare in
order to do so. Moreover, if  J and  Jf are equal, then the self-interested
and the reciprocal welfare functions coincide for country J . In brief, equation
(2.6) signies that from country Js standpoint, any  J below  Jf is a fair
(or kind) action on the part of country  J that should be rewarded, whereas
any  J in excess of  Jf is an unfair (or unkind) action that should be
punished.
2.3 Static Game
Our aim in this section is to characterize the static Nash equilibrium of our
model, and compare it with the one that would emerge in a game with self-
interested countries. This equilibrium will serve as a credible punishment in
the dynamic game considered in the next section, the threat of which can
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support multilateral tari¤ cooperation in a repeated setting.23 To this end,
let the static game with self-interested countries be denoted by  S(SW ),
while  R(RW;w; ! f ) represents the static game with reciprocal countries,
where  ! f 
 
Jf ; 
 J
f

is the fair-tari¤ vector. We henceforth assume that
Jf = 
 J
f   f , i.e., the countries have a common fair-tari¤ perception.
The reason for this assumption is twofold. First, it considerably simplies
the analysis. Second, asymmetries of a not too high degree in fair-tari¤
perceptions between the (otherwise symmetric) countries would not a¤ect
the qualitative nature of our ndings.24
It is direct to show that the cross-partial derivative of the welfare function
of reciprocal country J with respect to its own tari¤and country Js tari¤ is
nonnegative (i.e., @RW
J
@J@ J  0). This means country Js incremental returns
from raising its own tari¤ are nondecreasing in its partners tari¤, i.e., the
choice variables are strategic complements. On the other hand, the cross-
partial derivative of country Js welfare function with respect to its tari¤ and
its fair-tari¤perception is nonpositive (i.e., @RW
J
@J@f
 0). To gain some insight
for the sign of these derivatives, simply recall that (i) increasing J inicts
a negative terms-of-trade externality on country  J (given our countries are
"large"); and (ii) a higher  J ( f) results ceteris paribus in a smaller (larger)
wJ .
23In fact, the static Nash equilibrium would be the unique equilibrium for the dynamic
game as well if a multilateral trade agreement were not feasible (e.g., due to exogenous,
political reasons or because the countries were highly impatient and did not value the
future at all).
24Upon request, a technical appendix is available from the authors in which we reproduce
our analysis allowing for asymmetries in fair-tari¤ perceptions between the countries that
are not too high. See also footnote 29.
56
CHAPTER 2. MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION UNDER
FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY
Our rst result establishes the existence of a pure symmetric Nash equi-
librium for both  R(RW;w; ! f ) and  S(SW ).
Lemma 1 For the static game with reciprocal countries  R(RW;w; ! f ),
there exist largest and smallest pure symmetric Nash equilibria,
 !
 NR 
(NR; NR) and
 ! NR  (NR; NR). Moreover, for the static game with
self-interested countries  S(SW ), there also exist largest and smallest pure
symmetric Nash equilibria,
 !
 NS  (NS; NS) and  ! NS  (NS; NS).
We next show how countries fair-tari¤ perception a¤ects the extremal
equilibrium tari¤s of  R(RW;w; ! f ).
Lemma 2 The largest and the smallest pure Nash equilibria of
 R(RW;w; ! f ), i.e.,
 !
 NR  (NR; NR) and  ! NR  (NR; NR), are non-
increasing in  f .
Intuitively, as we argued above, for a given  J , a higher  f leads to a
larger wJ . Consequently, country J now wishes to reduce the terms-of-trade
negative externality of its tari¤ on its trading partner when choosing its
import policy, resulting in more liberal Nash tari¤ equilibria.
It turns out that all our results hold independently of whether we con-
sider the largest or the smallest pure Nash equilibria of  R(RW;w; ! f ) and
 S(SW ). Therefore, without loss of generality, we drop from now on the
"bar" notation and simply write  ! NR  (NR; NR) and  ! NS  (NS; NS),
referring to either
 !
 NR and
 !
 NS, or
 ! NR and  ! NS, respectively. In addi-
tion, we hereafter assume that (i)  6= 0 so that country Js fairness payo¤
is nonzero for  J 6=  f ; and (ii)  f  NS, i.e., overly restrictive import
policies are considered unfair, which is a reasonable assumption given our
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focus on trade cooperation among countries. We next compare NR with
NS as well as the welfare obtained in  R(RW;w;
 ! f ) and  S(SW ).
Proposition 1 Under our models assumptions, (i) NR  NS; and (ii)
for any J , RW J( ! NR;  f )  SW J( ! NS), with equality only holding for
 f = NS.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that reciprocal countries end up with a more
protectionist and thus welfare-inferior Nash equilibrium than self-interested
countries. The intuition is straightforward. At NS, reciprocal countries are
in a negative-reciprocity state wishing to punish each other (since  f  NS),
implying that the Nash equilibrium tari¤ of  R(RW;w; ! f ) must exceed the
one of  S(SW ).25
2.4 Dynamic Game
We now study repeated interaction between the countries. In particular,
the dynamic game we consider is the stage game analyzed above innitely
repeated. We assume that countries cannot make binding international com-
mitments but are instead limited to self-enforcing trade agreements. In such a
setting, countries can still maintain multilateral trade cooperation, whose de-
gree depends critically on how severely they can credibly punish an o¤ender.
Our aim in this section is to evaluate the e¤ect of fairness and reciprocity on
the ability of countries to cooperate with low import tari¤s.
25At this point, a technical note is in order. Our results do not require di¤erentiability of
RW J(). Rather, our ndings would still hold under the signicantly weaker assumptions
that RW J() has increasing di¤erences in
 
J ;  J

and decreasing di¤erences in
 
J ; f

.
Nevertheless, for expositional simplicity, we have chosen to work with di¤erentiable welfare
functions.
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To this end, denote the innitely repeated game with reciprocal countries
by  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ), and the one with self-interested countries by  S1(SW ).
The discount factor between periods is  2 (0; 1). For both games, we focus
on symmetric cooperative subgame-perfect equilibria in which (i) along the
equilibrium path, the countries set a common cooperative tari¤ C < NS in
each period; and (ii) if at any point in the game a defection occurs, both coun-
tries revert from the following period onwards to the noncooperative Nash
tari¤ of the (relevant) stage game.26 In other words, to enforce cooperation,
the countries employ a grim-trigger strategy.
We begin our analysis with  S1(SW ). The static incentive self-interested
country J has to cheat is dened as:
SW J(BRJS(C); C)  SW J( ! C)  SW JD   SW JC  
JS (C) , (2.7)
where BRJS(C) is country Js best-response tari¤ to C and
 ! C  (C ; C).

JS equals simply the onetime increase in welfare country J achieves when it
optimally chooses a tari¤ on its reaction curve while its trading partner still
cooperates with C . On the other hand, violating multilateral cooperation
also bears consequences as a trade war ensues. The discounted future welfare
26Given the overall symmetry of our framework, it is only natural to focus on symmetric
equilibria, which imply an equal split between the countries of the gains from cooperation.
Actually, it can be readily shown that such a split supports the highest degree of multi-
lateral trade cooperation in our setting. On a di¤erent note, observe that for both games
we restrict our attention to cooperative tari¤s lower than NS . This enables us to better
compare  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) with  S1(SW ), which is our main goal in this paper.
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cost a defector faces equals:

1  
 
SW J( ! C)  SW J( ! NS)

 
1  
 
SW JC   SW JN

 
1  !
J
S (C) ,
(2.8)
where !JS is the per-period value of cooperation for country J , i.e., the
per-period increase in country Js welfare under multilateral cooperation
as compared with its welfare during a tari¤ war. Therefore, the incentive-
compatibility condition for a self-interested country J to adhere to the coop-
erative path in  S1(SW ) is that the onetime gain from defection, 

J
S, does
not outweigh the discounted value of future cooperation, 
1 !
J
S:

JS (C) 

1  !
J
S (C) . (2.9)
From (2.9), it is direct to show that a given cooperative tari¤ C can be
supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game as long as
countries are patient enough, or:
  SC 
SW JD   SW JC
SW JD   SW JN
. (2.10)
Analogous relationships hold for countries with reciprocal preferences. In
particular, the incentive-compatibility condition for a reciprocal country J
to uphold multilateral cooperation is given by:

JR (C) 

1  !
J
R (C) . (2.11)
Moreover, for a given cooperative tari¤ C , the minimum discount factor
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required so that the tari¤ in question can be multilaterally sustained equals:
RC 
RW JD  RW JC
RW JD  RW JN
. (2.12)
Our next lemma demonstrates that reciprocal countries can support a
fairly liberal cooperative tari¤ as long as they are su¢ ciently patient.
Lemma 3 Let C   f be a cooperative tari¤. Then a su¢ ciently high
discount factor exists such that  ! C is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
for  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ).
Let us, in all that follows, maintain the (nonrestrictive) assumption that
 is su¢ ciently small, meaning that the relative weight of the fairness payo¤
in the countriesobjective function (or, equivalently, the relative weight the
countries place on their trading partners self-interested welfare) is not too
high.27 We are at this point ready to state our rst result about the impact
of fairness and reciprocity on multilateral trade cooperation. Using (2.10)
and (2.12), we now compare SC against 
R
C
, where C   f . Remember
that  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) and  S1(SW ) are identical in all respects except for the
fairness payo¤ in the countrieswelfare function.
Proposition 2 Let C   f be a cooperative tari¤. The critical discount
factor above which multilateral cooperation can be maintained at C is lower
in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) than in  S1(SW ), i.e., RC < 
S
C
.
The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is straightforward once it is recalled
that for any cooperative tari¤ C lower than the fair tari¤  f , the countries
27The derivation of a closed-form solution for the upper bound of  has proved elusive.
In the simulations in the next section where a simplied model is presented,  is set less
than or equal to 0:1.
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attach a positive weight to their partners self-interested welfare, i.e., they
are in a positive-reciprocity state. Two reinforcing forces are at work here.
On the one hand, for any country J , the value of cooperation at C is higher
in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) than in  S1(SW ) since in the former game (i) the non-
cooperative (punitive) Nash tari¤ is higher; and (ii) innite Nash reversion
would also be costly for Js trading partner, which acts to heighten the cost
of the punishment phase for country J itself. On the other hand, the static
incentive country J has to deviate from C is weaker in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) than
in  S1(SW ) because in the former game (i) the defect tari¤ is lower, since the
countries are in a positive-reciprocity state; and (ii) defection would hurt Js
partner, mitigating Js potential onetime gains from cheating. It then follows
that reciprocal countries can more easily support any given cooperative tari¤
below the fair tari¤ than self-interested ones.
Let now  ! CS  (CS; CS) be the most cooperative equilibrium tari¤
vector of  s1(SW ), i.e., CS is the smallest nonnegative tari¤ that does not
invite cheating in the dynamic game with self-interested countries. Simi-
larly,  ! CR  (CR; CR) is the most cooperative equilibrium tari¤ vector of
 R1(RW;w;
 ! f ).28 Clearly, CS (CR) is the most cooperative equilibrium
tari¤ of  s1(SW ) ( 
R
1(RW;w;
 ! f )) when  = SCS ( = 
R
CR
). Moreover,
we assume in the remainder of this section that  2 [; ] so that both self-
interested and reciprocal countries can maintain some cooperation in trade
policies but global free trade is infeasible for either of them. The next propo-
sition compares CR with CS assuming the countries are moderately de-
28Note that the most cooperative equilibrium is the most natural focal point of either
game since (i) it is the only equilibrium of the desired class that is not Pareto dominated;
and (ii) nothing precludes preplay communication between the countries.
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manding from their trading partners regarding their commercial policy (i.e.,
assuming the fair tari¤ is not too low).
Proposition 3 Let  f  CS. Then the most cooperative equilibrium tari¤
of  s1(SW ) is higher than the one of  
R
1(RW;w;
 ! f ), i.e., CS > CR.
The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is the same as the one behind Propo-
sition 2.
Finally, we compare CR with CS assuming now that the countries are
highly demanding from their trading partners with respect to their import
policy (i.e., assuming that only very liberal import policies are considered
fair).
Proposition 4 Let  f < CS. Then the e¤ect of fairness and reciprocity on
the most cooperative tari¤ equilibrium of the dynamic game is ambiguous.
To gain some insight for Proposition 4, recall that for any cooperative tari¤
C higher than the fair tari¤  f , the countries attach a negative weight to
their partners self-interested welfare, i.e., they are in a negative-reciprocity
state. Two observations can then be readily made for any such C >  f . On
the one hand, for any country J , the value of cooperation at C is higher in
 R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) than in  S1(SW ) since the punitive Nash tari¤ is higher in
the former game. Of course, innite Nash reversion would be costly also for
country  J , which acts to lower the cost of the punishment phase for country
J in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ), but this e¤ect is relatively weak for a su¢ ciently small
. On the other hand, country J has a stronger incentive to deviate from
C in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) than in  S1(SW ) since in the former game (i) the
defect tari¤is higher, because the countries are in a negative-reciprocity state;
63
CHAPTER 2. MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION UNDER
FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY
and (ii) defection would hurt country  J , raising the gains from cheating
for country J . Hence, it is ambiguous whether reciprocal or self-interested
countries can more easily sustain any given cooperative tari¤ above the fair
tari¤. As a result, when only very liberal trade policies are considered fair,
the overall e¤ect of reciprocity on multilateral tari¤ cooperation could be
negative. This is more clearly illustrated in the next section within the
context of a simplied model.29
At a more general level, Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrate that if, for
whatever reason, countries become more demanding from their trading part-
ners with respect to their import policy (i.e., if the fair tari¤ decreases),
a given cooperative equilibrium that could have been otherwise supported,
might no longer be feasible. This then suggests that if countries enter a round
of multilateral trade negotiations with elevated expectations due to economic
and/or political reasons, they might fail to reach an agreement on further
multilateral trade liberalization, even though such an agreement might have
been attainable in the absence of these high expectations. Therefore, Propo-
sitions 3 and 4 provide a novel perspective on the occasional failures of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations, as in the ongoing Doha Round.
29At this point, we should note that asymmetries in fair-tari¤ perceptions would not
a¤ect the qualitative nature of our ndings as long as the countries remained symmetri-
cally demanding from each other with respect to their trade policy. In particular, under
asymmetric fair-tari¤ perceptions, Proposition 3 would still hold as long as  Jf  
 J
CS for
any country J , whereas Proposition 4 would be still valid as long as  Jf < 
 J
CS for all J .
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2.5 Simplied Model
In this section, we reproduce the results of the paper within a simple setup
with linear demand curves and a specic functional form for wJ( J ;  f ).
This serves two goals. First, it enables us to better illustrate the insights
from our model. At the same time, the results obtained here can be more
easily related to the ones found in a substantial part of the literature on
trade agreements that uses similar demand specications (e.g., Bagwell and
Staiger, 1999b; Freund, 2000; Ornelas, 2005; Saggi and Yildiz, 2010). To this
end, let the demand for good j in country J be given by:
D
 
P Jj

=   P Jj , (2.13)
where  > 1
2
;  > 0 are constants. Moreover, let us assume that the weight
function wJ is of the following form:
wJ( J ;  f ) =
 f    J
 f +  J
2 ( 1; 1) . (2.14)
We rst look at the static game, and in particular at  S(SW ). It turns
out the best-response tari¤ of country J equals:
BRJS(
 J) =
1
3
, (2.15)
meaning both countries have the same dominant strategy. Then, trivially:
NS =
1
3
. (2.16)
65
CHAPTER 2. MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION UNDER
FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY
However, the analysis for  R(RW;w; ! f ) is slightly more involved. The
countries no longer have a dominant strategy. Rather:
BRJR(
 J) =
(1 + ) J + (1  ) f
 [3( J +  f ) + ( J    f )]
. (2.17)
It is direct to show that BRJR(
 J) is strictly decreasing in  f and strictly
increasing in  J . Simple algebra then yields:
NR =
1 +    (3  ) f +
p
4(1  )(3 + ) f + (1 +    (3  ) f )2
2(3 + )
.
(2.18)
Two conclusions can be drawn from equation (2.18). First, if  f = NS = 13 ,
then NR collapses to NS. Second, we have that @NR@f < 0, implying that if
 f < NS, then NR > NS, which is in line with Proposition 1.
Next, we turn to the dynamic game. Straightforward calculations reveal
that the most cooperative equilibrium tari¤ for  S1(SW ) equals:
CS =
3  5
(9  3) , (2.19)
meaning that free trade could be supported by self-interested countries for
  3=5.
In order to now compare CS with the most cooperative equilibrium tar-
i¤ of  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ), CR, we resort for expositional simplicity to graph-
ical/numerical analysis, while maintaining the (nonrestrictive) assumptions
that  f < NS and C < NS.30 Let us consider rst the per-period value of
30The analysis was carried out using Mathematica. The le is available from the authors
upon request.
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cooperation for country J in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) and  S1(SW ): !JR and !JS, re-
spectively. Figure 2.1 depicts the relation between the two: !JR > !
J
S for any
C 2 (0; NS). Intuitively, two forces are at work here. First, the punitive
Nash tari¤ is higher in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ) than in  S1(SW ), i.e., NR > NS.
Second, innite Nash reversion would also be costly for Js partner. This
could raise or lower the cost of the punishment phase for country J itself in
 R1(RW;w;
 ! f ), depending on whether the countries are in a positive- or a
negative-reciprocity state, i.e., depending on whether C is below or above
 f . In any case, for su¢ ciently low , this e¤ect is relatively weak.
Figure 2.1: Incentive to Cooperate
We next examine the static incentive country J has to cheat in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f )
67
CHAPTER 2. MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION UNDER
FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY
and  S1(SW ): 

J
R and 

J
S, correspondingly. As Figure 2.2 reveals, the for-
mer is weaker if and only if C 2 (0;  f ). The intuition is straightforward.
For any given C below  f , the countries are in a positive-reciprocity state.
This has a dampening e¤ect on the defect tari¤. Moreover, defection would
be costly for Js partner, which acts to mitigate the potential onetime gains
from cheating for J in  R1(RW;w;
 ! f ). As a result, 
JR < 
JS for any such
C . Of course, the reverse is true for cooperative tari¤s above the fair tari¤,
i.e., 
JR > 

J
S for C >  f .
Figure 2.2: Incentive to Deviate
Therefore, for  f 2 [CS; NS), reciprocal countries have a stronger incen-
tive to cooperate and a weaker incentive to defect than self-interested coun-
tries around CS, implying that the former can support more liberal trade
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policies than the latter, or CR < CS. However, for  f < CS, reciprocal
countries have around CS both a stronger incentive to cheat and a stronger
incentive to cooperate than self-interested ones. In other words, there are two
o¤setting forces at play for low fair-tari¤ perceptions, making the compari-
son between CS and CR less clear-cut. Our simulations do conrm that for
very low fair tari¤s, CR does indeed exceed CS, as we depict in Figure 2.3.
Actually, it is interesting to note that CR is more likely to exceed CS when 
is relatively low, i.e., when the countries are relatively impatient. This is due
to the fact that a lower  weakens the relative signicance of the stronger-
incentive-to-cooperate force, while it leaves the stronger-incentive-to-cheat
force una¤ected. To summarize, when countries are highly demanding from
their trading partners regarding their commercial policy, reciprocity could
have a detrimental e¤ect on multilateral tari¤ cooperation, and this is more
likely to occur if countries are relatively impatient.
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Figure 2.3: Most Cooperative Tari¤
2.6 Endogenizing Fairness
We have hitherto assumed that perceptions of fairness are exogenous and
constant between periods. This is consistent with the experimental work of
Fehr and Falk (1999) who in a wage-setting context nd virtually no change in
either behavior or perceptions of fairness over time. However, one could argue
that countriesperceptions of a fair tari¤might adjust during the course of the
game. As Kahneman et al. (1986, pp.730-1) write: "Psychological studies of
adaptation suggest that any stable state of a¤airs tends to become accepted
eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no longer readily come
to mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in time
acquire the status of a reference transaction...they [people] adapt their views
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of fairness to the norms of actual behavior."31 In this section, we extend our
analysis by allowing for endogenous formation of fair-tari¤ perceptions, and
investigate whether our main predictions so far still hold.
To this end, we adapt to our discrete-time framework an equation widely
used in the habit formation literature (e.g., Ryder and Heal, 1973; Carroll
et al., 2000; Fuhrer, 2000), assuming current tari¤s a¤ect future fair-tari¤
perceptions as follows:
 J;tf = 
 J;t 1 + (1  )  J;t 1f , for any J , (2.20)
where  2 (0; 1). Equation (2.20) indicates that country Js fair-tari¤ per-
ception today is a linear combination of its last periods fair-tari¤ perception
and of the tari¤ it actually faced in that period. In other words, if country
 J behaves kindly today by choosing an import tari¤ below the one country
J deems fair, then country J will be more demanding next period (i.e.,  Jf
decreases), which acts to lower its fairness payo¤ for any given  J . On the
other hand, if country  J imposes an unfairly high tari¤ today, then country
J will be less demanding next period (i.e.,  Jf increases), which acts to raise
its fairness payo¤ given a  J .32 It follows that as the game unfolds, country
Js fair-tari¤ perception converges to the tari¤ policy of its trading partner.
31See Franciosi et al. (1995) for experimental support of these ideas in a price-setting
context.
32It is only reasonable to assume that as the multilateral trading environment becomes
more liberal, countries become more demanding with respect to trade policy. For example,
it is logical to expect that the tari¤s deemed fair nowadays are substantially lower as
compared with the ones in the late 1940s when the actual tari¤s in place were signicantly
higher than the current ones.
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More formally:  J;tf    J;t !t!1 0. (2.21)
We are now prepared to examine whether our main conclusions heretofore
are a¤ected in any fundamental way by (2.20). Let us make the assumption
that  is not too big (i.e., countries do not adjust their reference levels too
fast). Clearly, endogenizing fairness has no impact on the static game. At
the same time, in the dynamic game, the major di¤erence equation (2.20)
introduces is that both NR and CR vary over time. However, given an 
and an initial fair-tari¤ perception, we can readily derive the future fair-tari¤
perceptions, and hence  tNR and 
t
CR for all t.
It is direct to show that if the fair tari¤ initially exceeds the most cooper-
ative equilibrium tari¤ of the self-interested game, then CR remains below
CS along the equilibrium path, which is along the lines of Proposition 3.
Intuitively, under this scenario, the countries start with a CR below CS.
As the game progresses,  f converges to CR, and thus, CR converges to
CS (since wJ converges to zero). But for a su¢ ciently low ,  f never falls
below CS, implying CR never exceeds CS (by Proposition 3).
Moreover, a result analogous to Proposition 4 is obtained: If the fair tari¤
is initially smaller than CS, then the e¤ect of fairness and reciprocity on
multilateral tari¤ cooperation is ambiguous, since the countries might start
with a CR either below or above CS. Eventually though, under this scenario
as well, the reciprocal game converges to the self-interested one (in innite
time). In summary, allowing for endogenously formed fair-tari¤ perceptions
does not a¤ect the qualitative nature of our ndings (as long as  is not too
high).
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper has explored the impact of fairness and reciprocity on multilateral
tari¤ cooperation. In particular, we examined whether reciprocal countries
can sustain a greater degree of cooperation than self-interested ones in the
context of self-enforcing multilateral tari¤ agreements. This is an important
question given that governments and consumers seem to exhibit reciprocal
preferences towards commercial policy. In our setting, a reciprocal country
is willing to reward its trading partners by imposing lower tari¤s if it expects
them to behave kindly by setting their tari¤s below the one it perceives as
fair. However, when it expects its partners to behave unkindly by choosing
tari¤s in excess of the one it deems fair, it wishes to punish them and is
willing to sacrice some of its own self-interested welfare in order to do so.
We have demonstrated that as compared with self-interested countries,
reciprocal ones that are moderately demanding from their trading partners
regarding their commercial policy (i.e., when the commercial policies deemed
fair are not too liberal) can support lower cooperative tari¤s and therefore
achieve higher welfare in an innitely-repeated tari¤ game. Nevertheless,
when countries are highly demanding from their partners with respect to their
import policy (i.e., when only very liberal import policies are considered fair),
reciprocity could have a detrimental e¤ect on multilateral tari¤ cooperation.
Our ndings therefore provide a novel perspective on the successes and the
occasional failures of multilateral trade negotiations, and suggest a plausible
explanation for the problems plaguing the Doha Round since its initiation in
2001. In particular, countries might have entered the Doha negotiations with
too high expectations (i.e., with very low far-tari¤perceptions), hindering the
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e¤orts for further multilateral trade liberalization. Finally, we have argued
that our results are robust to allowing for fair-tari¤ perceptions that are
endogenously determined during the course of the game.
In concluding, a couple of remarks are in order. First, our framework
here could be readily applied to other types of agreements among countries
that are constrained to be self-enforcing, such as international environmen-
tal agreements. For instance, it would be interesting to investigate whether
reciprocal countries can sustain a greater degree of cooperation in abatement
standards than self-interested ones. Second, another promising avenue for
future research would be to examine how regional trade agreements a¤ect
countriesfair-tari¤ perceptions and thus their ability to multilaterally coop-
erate. Given the unprecedented proliferation of such arrangements in recent
years, this is a particularly important question.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: We rst consider  R(RW;w; ! f ). Given that the
number of countries is nite and that for any country J (i) J is a compact
interval in R+; (ii) RW J is twice continuously di¤erentiable on J ; and
(iii) @RW
J
@J@ J  0, we know from Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990)
that  R(RW;w; ! f ) is a (smooth) supermodular game. It then follows from
Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) that (i) there exist largest and
smallest serially undominated strategies for each country J , J and J ; and
(ii) the strategy proles
 !
 
 
J ;  J

and  ! 
 
J ;  J

are pure Nash
equilibrium proles. Finally, given the overall symmetry of our model, we
have that JNR = 
 J
NR  NR and JNR =  JNR  NR.
The second part of the lemma is straightforward once it is recalled that
 S(SW ) can be obtained from  R(RW;w; ! f ) by setting  = 0, meaning
that  S(SW ) is also a (smooth) supermodular game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Given that (i)  R(RW;w; ! f ) is a supermodular game;
and (ii) @RW
J
@J@f
 0 for any J , the lemma follows immediately from Theorem
6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: If  f = NS, then trivially NR = NS  N ,
and for any J , RW J( ! N ;  f ) = SW J( ! N) since wJ(N ;  f ) = 0 by (2.6).
On the other hand, if  f < NS, then NR  NS by Lemma 2. These two
inequalities imply NR >  f , and thus for any J , wJ(NR;  f ) < 0 from (2.6).
Moreover, for NR  NS, SW J( ! NR)  SW J( ! NS) for all J . But then it
follows that for all J , RW J( ! NR;  f ) < SW J( ! NS). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: If C   f , we have from (2.6) that for all J ,
wJ(C ;  f )  0, implying:
RW J( ! C ;  f )  SW J( ! C). (2.22)
In addition, we know that:
SW J( ! C) > SW J( ! NS). (2.23)
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Furthermore, we have from Proposition 1 that for any J :
RW J( ! NR;  f )  SW J( ! NS). (2.24)
From (2.22), (2.23), and (2.24), we then obtain for all J :
RW J( ! C ;  f ) > RW J( ! NR;  f ),
which implies by Friedman (1971) that there exists a su¢ ciently high discount
factor such that ! C is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for  R1(RW;w; ! f ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We want to show that C   f implies that
RC =
RWJD RWJC
RWJD RWJN
<
SWJD SWJC
SWJD SWJN
= SC . To do so, we will prove:
(i) If C   f ) RW JD  RW JC  SW JD   SW JC for any J .
(ii) If C   f ) RW JD  RW JN > SW JD   SW JN for any J .
Let us start with (i). We have that for any J :
RW JC = SW
J( ! C) + wJ(C ;  f )SW J( ! C) and
RW JD = SW
J(BRJR(C); C) + w
J(C ;  f )SW
 J(BRJR(C); C).
Therefore:
RW JD  RW JC = SW J(BRJR(C); C)  SW J( ! C)
+wJ(C ;  f )
 
SW J(BRJR(C); C)  SW J( ! C)

(2.25)
 SW J(BRJR(C); C)  SW J( ! C)
 SW J(BRJS(C); C)  SW J( ! C) = SW JD   SW JC .
We know from (2.6) that wJ(C ;  f )  0 if C   f . Furthermore, the
welfare of self-interested country  J is (weakly) lower when country J de-
viates while it still cooperates than when both countries cooperate, i.e.,
SW J(BRJR(C); C)   SW J( ! C)  0. The rst inequality then follows.
The second inequality stems from the fact that BRJS(C) is the best reply of
the self-interested country J . This concludes the proof of (i).
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We now turn to (ii). Let us rewrite the result we want to show:
C   f )
 
RW JD   SW JD

 
 
RW JN   SW JN

> 0 for any J .
By Proposition 1 we know that the Nash equilibrium tari¤ of  S(SW ) is
(weakly) smaller than that of  R(RW;w; ! f ), i.e., NR  NS. Thus, we
have that  f  NS  NR, implying that wJ(NR;  f )  0 by (2.6). There-
fore, the following inequality holds for any J :
RW JN = SW
J( ! NR) + wJ(NR;  f )SW J( ! NR) (2.26)
 SW J( ! NR)  SW J( ! NS) = SW JN .
Next we will show that RW JD SW JD  0 for any J . Remember that  is
assumed to be su¢ ciently small. Taking a rst-order Taylor series expansion
of RW J(BRJR(C); C ;  f ) around  = 0, we obtain:
RW J(BRJR(C); C ;  f )  SW J(BRJS(C); C)+
+ wJ(C ;  f )SW
 J(BRJS(C); C),
, RW J(BRJR(C); C ;  f )  SW J(BRJS(C); C) 
 wJ(C ;  f )SW J(BRJS(C); C)  0, (2.27)
, RW JD   SW JD  0.
The inequality holds due to wJ(C ;  f )  0. By assumption, we have that
C < NS, and thus  f cannot be equal to both C and NS at the same
time. Hence, at least one of the inequalities in (2.26) and (2.27) must be
strict. This concludes the proof of part (ii). Therefore, by (i) and (ii), we
nally have RC < 
S
C
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: From Proposition 2, we know that for any coop-
erative tari¤ C   f , RC < 
S
C
. So, given the assumptions of Proposition
3, this is also true for the most cooperative equilibrium tari¤ of the repeated
game with self-interested countries, CS: 
R
CS
< SCS . Note that both self-
interested and reciprocal countries can sustain CS at the discount factor
SCS , but only reciprocal countries can support CS at 
R
CS
. From (2.10) and
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(2.12), we have:
SW JD   SW JC = SCS
 
SW JD   SW JN

and
RW JD  RW JC = RCS
 
RW JD  RW JN

.
Since RCS < 
S
CS
:
RW JD  RW JC < SCS
 
RW JD  RW JN

,
,
 
1  SCS

RW J(BRJR(CS); CS;  f ) (2.28)
< RW J( ! CS;  f )  SCSRW
J ( ! NR;  f ) , (2.29)
meaning that 
JR (CS) <
SCS
1 SCS
!JR (CS), or that the incentive-compatibility
condition is not binding for a reciprocal country J at the pair (CS; 
S
CS
).
Note here that RW JN does not depend on the cooperative tari¤. Moreover,
for any cooperative tari¤ C lower than the most cooperative equilibrium
tari¤ of  s1(SW ), CS, the welfare for reciprocal country J under defection
from C is higher than the welfare under deviation from CS:
RW J(BRJR(C); C ;  f ) > RW
J(BRJR(CS); CS;  f ).
At the same time, for such a C < CS, country Js welfare under cooperation
is also higher at C than at CS:
RW J( ! C ;  f ) > RW J( ! CS;  f ).
By the continuity of RW J(), then there exists a cooperative tari¤bC < CS
such that (??) still holds, or 
JR (bC) < SCS1 SCS !JR (bC). Since the same
analysis applies to any (CS; 
S
CS
) pair for SCS 2 [; ], we have that for any
 2 [; ], CS > CR. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Proposition 2 holds for any cooperative tari¤ C
(weakly) lower than the fair tari¤  f . However, for any C >  f , it is am-
biguous by (2.25) and (2.27) whether RC or 
S
C
is higher, since the weight
function is negative at C . Hence, it is possible that the minimum discount
factor required for countries with reciprocal preferences to sustain coopera-
tion at C is higher than that for self-interested countries, i.e., 
R
C
> SC .
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Let us consider this case rst, and focus on the most cooperative equilibrium
tari¤ of  s1(SW ), CS. Under the scenario in question, both types of coun-
tries could sustain cooperation at CS only with a level of discount factor
equal to RCS or above. Moreover, let us make the assumption that 

J
R () is
a strictly convex function whereas !JR () is a strictly concave one.33 From
(2.12) and (2.10), we have:
RW JD  RW JC = RCS
 
RW JD  RW JN

and
SW JD   SW JC = SCS
 
SW JD   SW JN

.
Since RCS > 
S
CS
:
RW JD  RW JC > SCS
 
RW JD  RW JN

,
 
1  SCS

RW J(BRJR(CS); CS; f )
> RW J( ! CS;  f )  SCSRW
J ( ! NR;  f ) ,
meaning that 
JR (CS) >
SCS
1 SCS
!JR (CS), or that the incentive-compatibility
condition is violated for a reciprocal country J at the pair (CS; 
S
CS
).
For any cooperative tari¤ C higher (lower) than the most cooperative
equilibrium tari¤ of  s1(SW ), CS, the onetime gain for reciprocal country J
under defection from C is lower (higher) than the static gain under deviation
from CS:

JR (C) < (>)

J
R (CS) .
At the same time, for such a C > (<)CS, country Js per-period gain from
cooperation is also lower (higher) at C than at CS:
!JR (C) < (>)!
J
R (CS) .
Given the strict convexity of 
JR () and the strict concavity of !JR (), it
follows that the incentive-compatibility condition for reciprocal country J
can only be restored at a cooperative tari¤bC > CS. Since the same analysis
applies to any (CS; 
S
CS
) pair for SCS 2 [; ], we have that for any  2 [; ],
CS < CR.
Nevertheless, RCS < 
S
CS
is also possible by (??) and (??). In this case,
as we showed in the proof of Proposition 3, CS > CR. Therefore, when
 f < CS, it is ambiguous whether CR or CS is higher due to the ambiguity
33This assumption is clearly not restrictive given the type of result we are here after.
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of whether RCS or 
S
CS
is higher. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 3
Tacit Collusion under Fairness
and Reciprocity
This paper departs from the standard prot-maximizing model of rm behav-
ior by assuming that managers are motivated in part by personal animosity
or respecttowards their rivals. A reciprocal manager responds to unkind
behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the
same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (positive
reciprocity). We nd that if fairness payo¤s are small by comparison with
monetary payo¤s, then collusive action proles (prices or quantities) are eas-
ier to sustain when rms have reciprocal managers. Thus, fairness concerns
among rms with reciprocal managers can have adverse welfare consequences
for consumers.
Keywords: Fairness; Reciprocity; Collusion; Repeated Games.
JEL Classication Numbers: D43, D63, L13, L21.
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3.1 Introduction
The assumption that individuals behave as if maximizing their material pay-
o¤s, despite its central role in economic analysis, is at odds with a large
body of evidence from psychology and from experimental economics. Eco-
nomic agents often pursue objectives other than actual payo¤maximization.
Many observed departures from material payo¤ maximizing behavior arise
through actions that favor fairness or reciprocity.
Fairness and reciprocity have been shown to explain behavior in bargain-
ing games and in trust games. For example, in ultimatum games o¤ers are
usually much more generous than predicted by equilibrium and low o¤ers
are often rejected. These o¤ers are consistent with an equilibrium in which
proposers make o¤ers knowing that responders may reject allocations that
appear unfair.
The impact of fairness and reciprocity on market outcomes is an active
area of research. Rabin (1993) and Rotemberg (forthcoming) show that
fairness concerns by the part of consumers can improve consumer welfare.
For example, Rabin (1993) nds that a monopolist ought to set price lower
than the monopoly priceif consumers have concerns about fairness.
In this paper we ask whether reciprocity may help to sustain collusive
behavior. For instance, if a collusive agreement is seen by the parties as a
fair outcome, then if one party reneges on the agreement and undercuts the
price (or boosts its output), its rivals may be o¤ended and hence punish the
deviator aggressively (even at extra cost to themselves).
To perform this analysis we rule out fairness concerns by the part of
consumers with respect to rms and vice-versa. This allows us to focus
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on the impact of fairness concerns among rms on collusive outcomes. The
assumption that rms have fairness concerns and behave reciprocally towards
their rivals nds support on experimental evidence where subjects play the
role of rms.
In Lehman (2001), individuals placed in the role of a manager were asked
to report satisfaction with various combinations of sales gures for their own
rm, as well as for a competing rm. Attention to fairness was found to be
a signicant factor.
Huck et al. (2001) show that a Stackelberg leader nds it hard to exploit
that advantage in experimental markets. The reason is that the Stackelberg
follower acts more aggressively than predicted by the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of these market games. In fact, followers punish the leader by supplying
a higher quantity than their most protable response to the leaders quantity.
This behavior is in line with the observed negative reciprocity of responders
in the ultimatum game when the proposer tries to exploit his rst-mover
advantage.
Armstrong and Huck (2010) argue that sometimes managers are moti-
vated in part by personal animosityor respecttowards a rival. Thus, rms
might punish rivals who behave unfairlytowards them. For example, rms
might sometimes care when their rivals obtain an unfairshare of industry
prots, for instance by cheating on a collusive agreement.
To model reciprocity we follow Segal and Sobel (2007) and assume that
players in a strategic environment have preferences not only over the out-
comes but also the strategies. A players utility is additively separable in
monetary and fairness payo¤s. Monetary payo¤s are revenues minus costs
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and fairness payo¤s are a weighted average of the rivalsmonetary payo¤s
where the weights depend on how the rivalschoices are expected to di¤er
from the fair ones. If a player expects a rival to play a kind (mean) strategy,
then he places a positive (negative) weight on that rivals monetary payo¤.
If a player expects a rival to play a fair strategy then he places zero weight
on that rivalsmonetary payo¤.
We start by showing that reciprocity can lead to more or less competitive
outcomes under static price competition. If players think that the fair prices
of the rivals are at most the smallest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the
game with self-interested players, then the equilibrium attained is a positive
reciprocity state. In this case reciprocity leads to a less competitive outcome
since equilibrium prices are higher with reciprocators than with self-interested
players. This happens because in a positive reciprocity state, reciprocators
want to reward the rivals for having set prices higher than the fair ones.
In contrast, if players believe that the fair prices of the rivals are at least
the largest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested
players, then the equilibrium attained is a negative reciprocity state. In this
case reciprocity leads to a more competitive outcome since equilibrium prices
are lower with reciprocators than with self-interested players. This happens
because in a negative reciprocity state, reciprocators want to punish the rivals
for having set prices lower than the fair ones.
In a standard setting, collusion can be sustained as an equilibrium by self-
interested players if they interact innitely often and are su¢ ciently patient.
A player is said to be patient if his discount factor is su¢ ciently close to one.
In order to determine whether collusion is or is not facilitated by reciprocity
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we compare the minimal discount factor that allows for collusion in the case
with reciprocity and in the standard case.
The main result of the paper shows that reciprocity facilitates collusion
when players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the collusive
prices and at least the largest equilibrium prices of the static game with
self-interested players. The intuition as follows.
If players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the collusive
prices, then collusion becomes a positive reciprocity state. In this case play-
ersmonetary payo¤s from collusion are the same as the ones obtained in
the game with self-interested players but in addition there are fairness payo¤
gains since players think that their rivals are being kind. This e¤ect makes
collusion more attractive to reciprocal players. Additionally, if players think
that the fair prices of the rivals are at least the largest equilibrium prices of
the static game with self-interested players, then Nash reversion becomes a
negative reciprocity state. This implies that the punishment imposed after
cheating occurs is more severe when players are reciprocal. This e¤ect also
makes collusion more attractive to reciprocal players. However, the short-
run benet to deviating is larger with reciprocal players because it includes
the payo¤ a player derives from being treated kindly by the rivals (the rivals
are playing their collusive prices). This e¤ect makes collusion less attractive
to reciprocal players. The assumption that monetary payo¤s are large by
comparison with fairness payo¤s implies that the increase in collusive payo¤
is of rst-order whereas the increase in the short-run benet to deviating is
of second-order.
We show that our main result also holds under quantity competition.
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In this case, reciprocity facilitates collusion when players think that the fair
output of the rivals is at least the collusive output and at most the equilibrium
output of the rivals in static game with self-interested players.
The analysis is mainly conducted assuming that players play Nash rever-
sion punishments. In the appendix we extend the analysis to the case where
players can play any credible punishment using penal codes à la Abreu (1988).
Our paper is an additional contribution to the literature on the factors
that help or hinder collusion. It is now well known that concentration, barri-
ers to entry, cross-ownership, symmetry and multi-market contracts facilitate
collusionsee Feuerstein (2005). We nd that reciprocity by the part of rms
can facilitate collusion.
The main policy implication of our paper is that fairness concerns by
rms with reciprocal managers can have adverse welfare consequences for
consumers. In contrast, Rabin (1993) and Rotemberg (forthcoming) nd
that fairness concerns by the part of consumers can increase consumer wel-
fare. Thus, social preferences in imperfectly competitive markets might lead
to di¤erent outcomes depending on who has such preferences (producers or
consumers) and what is the comparison group.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets-up the model.
Section 3 analyzes the impact that fairness and reciprocity have on incen-
tives for collusion when action choices are strategic complements. Section 4
considers the case of strategic substitutes. Section 5 discusses the ndings.
Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendix A contains the proofs of all results
in the main text. Appendix B states and proves results when players use
optimal punishments.
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3.2 Set-up
The existing theories of social preferences can be classied into three broad
categories. The rst one is the distributional preference approach where
social preferences only depend on the distribution of material payo¤s. This
includes Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). These
models are highly tractable and capture a wide range of phenomena but fail
to explain the fact that preferences depend on more than outcomes, namely,
intentions also matter.
The second category consists of intention-based models and includes Ra-
bin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher
(2006), among others. These models assume that reciprocity depends on
overall strategies and beliefs (and beliefs about beliefs) building on Geanako-
plos et al. (1989) theory of psychological games. In Rabin (1993) utility
is additively separable in monetary and fairness payo¤s and the weight a
player places on rivalsmonetary payo¤s depends on his perception of the ri-
valsintentions, which are evaluated using (i) beliefs about the rivalsstrategy
choices, and (ii) beliefs about the rivalsbeliefs about his strategy. Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004) develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive
form games where players update beliefs about intentions as the game un-
folds and make a choice accordingly. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) model
reciprocity in incomplete information games. Intention-based models have
two major weaknesses: they use specic functional forms and are highly
intractable.1
1Sobel (2005) points out some of the drawbacks of the distributional-preferences and
intention-based approaches to reciprocity.
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The third category explores the axiomatic foundations that generate util-
ity functions that display social preferences. Nielson (2006) proposes a prefer-
ence axiom which leads to a foundation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity
aversion model. Segal and Sobel (2007) provide an axiomatic foundation for
interdependent preferences that can reect reciprocity, inequity aversion, al-
truism as well as spitefulness. The key innovation of their approach is that,
in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic
environment also have preferences over strategy proles. This allows one to
study situations where a players preference is a¤ected by the behavior of
other players.
Their representation theorem shows that the payo¤ function of a player
with such preferences is of the form
Vi(i; 

 i) = ui(i; 

 i) +
X
j 6=i
wij(
)uj(i; 

 i); (3.1)
where i is the strategy of player i,  is how the game is expected to be
played, ui is the utility from outcomes of player i, uj is the utility from
outcomes of player j 6= i, and wij() is a coe¢ cient that measures the
weight player i gives to player js utility, which is a function of the entire
strategy prole. Positive values of the coe¢ cient mean that player i is willing
to sacrice his utility from outcomes in order to increase the payo¤ of player
j. Negative values mean that player i is willing to sacrice his utility from
outcomes in order to lower player js payo¤. Since the coe¢ cient depends on
the strategy chosen by player j; there is scope to model reciprocity.2
2The underlying preferences in (3.1) are dened over outcomes. If an outcome species
a material payo¤ to each player, then it is permissible for ui to depend on other players
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We apply Segal and Sobels (2007) approach to a dynamic game where
n players; n > 2; play the same stage game over an innite horizon t =
0; 1; 2; : : : : The repeated game monetary payo¤ of player i of choosing strat-
egy si = (a1i ; a
2
i ; :::) when rivals play strategies s i is given by
i(si; s i) =
1X
t=1
t 1i(a
t
i; a
t
 i); (3.2)
where i(ati; a
t
 i) represents player is monetary payo¤ at stage t, a function
of player is action at t, ati, and the actions of the rivals at t, a
t
 i: Players
discount the future at rate  2 (0; 1) : To model reciprocity we assume that
the weight player i places on player js repeated game monetary payo¤ de-
pends only on player js strategy and on player is perception of what is
the fair strategy of player j, sfij: We also assume throughout that players
preferences as well as their exogenous perceptions of the fair strategies of the
rivals are common knowledge. The repeated game payo¤ of reciprocal player
i of choosing strategy si = (a1i ; a
2
i ; :::) when rivals play strategies s i is given
by
Ui(si; s i; s
f
 i) =
1X
t=1
t 1i(a
t
i; a
t
 i) + 
X
j 6=i
1X
t=1
t 1wij(a
t
j; a
f
ij)j(a
t
i; a
t
 i)
(3.3)
where  > 0 is a normalization. The central behavioral feature of these
preferences is the assumption that players care about the intentions of the
rivals. If player i expects player j to treat him kindly, then wij will be
positive, and player i will wish to treat player j kindly. If player i expects
material payo¤s. Thus, this approach also generalizes the inequity aversion approach.
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player j to treat him badly, then wij will be negative, and player i will wish
to treat player j badly. If player i expects player j to be fair, then wij will
be zero, and there is no issue of reciprocity.
Denote the dynamic game with reciprocal players by  r1(u; s); where
u = (u1; :::; un) and s = (s1; ::::; sn) and the dynamic game with self-interested
players by  s1(; s); where  = (1; :::; n): Players are able to sustain a col-
lusive outcome when the payo¤ from collusion is no less than the payo¤ from
deviation. To understand how fairness and reciprocity inuence collusion
we will compare the incentive compatibility condition of self-interested play-
ers in  s1(; s) to that of reciprocal players in  
r
1(u; s) assuming that these
two games are identical in all respects (monetary payo¤s and the number of
players) with the exception of playerspreferences.
To perform this analysis we consider the cases where players actions
are strategic complements (e.g., price competition with products that are
imperfect substitutes) and strategic substitutes (e.g., quantity competition
with products that are perfect substitutes). We also consider two alternative
modes of punishments after deviations: Nash reversion and optimal punish-
ments.
The standard approach to study collusion in innitely repeated games
assumes that players use grim trigger strategies to punish any deviation from
collusion, that is, following a deviation players switch to a Nash equilibrium
of the stage game forever after. Thus, when self-interested player uses grim
trigger punishments in  s1(; s), each player i will prefer to play his collusive
strategy sci = (a
c
i ; a
c
i ; :::) if the payo¤ from collusion, i(a
c)=(1   ); is no
less than the payo¤ from defection which consists of the one period gain
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from deviating i(BRsi (a
c
 i); a
c
 i) plus the discounted payo¤of inducing Nash
reversion forever i(ans)=(1  ); that is,
i(BR
s
i (a
c
 i); a
c
 i) +

1  i(a
ns)  1
1  i(a
c): (3.4)
Solving for  we obtain
sac =
i(BR
s
i (a
c
 i); a
c
 i)  i(ac)
i(BRsi (a
c
 i); a
c
 i)  i(ans)
 : (3.5)
The collusion strategy prole sc can be sustained by self-interested players
who are patient enough such that sac   where sac is the critical discount
factor above which sc can be sustained by self-interested players.
The same reasoning applies when players have reciprocal preferences. A
reciprocal player i plays the collusive strategy sci in  
r
1(u; x) using a grim
trigger strategy as long as the following condition holds
ui(BR
r
i (a
c
 i); a
c
 i; a
f
 i) +

1  ui(a
nr; af i) 
1
1  ui(a
c; af i); (3.6)
where ui denotes the stage game payo¤ of a reciprocal player, a function of
the actions played and perceptions of the fair actions of the rivals. Solving
for  we obtain
rac =
ui(BR
r
i (a
c
 i); a
c
 i; a
f
 i)  ui(ac; a
f
 i)
ui(BRri (a
c
 i); a
c
 i; a
f
 i)  ui(anr; a
f
 i)
 : (3.7)
When players have reciprocal preferences it follows that the collusive strategy
prole sc can be sustained if players are patient enough such that rac  
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where rac is the critical discount factor above which s
c can be sustained by
reciprocal players.
We will use (3.5) and (3.7) to characterize the impact that fairness and
reciprocity have on collusion when players use grim trigger strategies. To
perform this analysis we compare the critical discount factor above which the
collusive strategy prole can be sustained when players are self-interested to
the critical discount factor when players are reciprocal. We say that fairness
and reciprocity facilitate collusion when the collusive strategy prole can be
sustained at a lower critical discount factor when players are reciprocal than
when they are self-interested. If the opposite happens we say that fairness
and reciprocity make collusion harder.
3.3 Strategic Complements
We now specialize the model by assuming that playersactions are strategic
complements. This assumption means that a players incremental returns
from increasing his own action are increasing in the rivals actions. The
canonical market game where playersactions are strategic complements is
price competition with imperfect substitutes. We use this game to study
the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion when playersactions are
strategic complements.
In each stage player i chooses price, pi, and his payo¤ in that stage is
ui(pi; p i; p
f
 i) = i(pi; p i) + 
P
j 6=i
wij(pj; p
f
ij)j(pi; p i); (3.8)
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where i(pi; p i) is the monetary payo¤ and 
P
j 6=iwij(pj; p
f
ij)j(pi; p i) the
fairness payo¤. The monetary payo¤ is the di¤erence between revenue and
cost, that is,
i(pi; p i) = Ri (pi; p i)  Ci(Di(pi; p i)) (3.9)
= piDi(pi; p i)  Ci(Di(pi; p i));
whereRi(pi; p i) is revenue, Ci(Di()) is the cost of production, andDi(pi; p i)
is the demand faced by player i. We assume that Di() is decreasing with
pi; increasing with p i, and Ci() is increasing with Di(): Furthermore, we
assume that
wij(pj; p
f
ij)
8>>><>>>:
> 0 if pj > p
f
ij
= 0 if pj = pf
< 0 otherwise
: (3.10)
The assumptions on wij(pj; p
f
ij) capture the fact that a reciprocal player cares
about the intentions of the rivals. The rst condition expresses positive or
constructive reciprocity. If a player expects one of her rivals to charge a price
higher than the fair price, then she puts a positive weight on that rivals prot
and she is willing to sacrice some of her prot to increase that rivals prot.
The second condition says that if a player expects one of her rivals to choose
the fair price, then she places no weight on that rivals prot. The third
condition expresses negative or destructive reciprocity. If player a expects
one of her rivals to undercut her perception of fair price, then she puts a
negative weight on that rivals prot and she is willing to sacrice some of
her prot to reduce that rivals prot.
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Let
Ai(pi; p i; p
f
 i) = argmax
pi2Pi
i(pi; p i) + 
P
j 6=i
wij(pj; p
f
ij)j(pi; p i); (3.11)
denote the set of maximizers of player is stage game problem as a function of
pi; p i and p
f
 i. For nite quantities, the players will never choose an innite
price. Hence, the playersprice choice set is compact set in R. We assume
that ui is order upper semi-continuous in pi. The choice set being compact
with this assumption guarantees that the set of maximizers Ai(pi; p i; p
f
 i) is
nonempty.
We also assume that ui has increasing di¤erences in (pi; p i), that is,
for any xed pf i, ui(pi; p
0
 i; p
f
 i)   ui(pi; p00 i; p
f
 i) is increasing in pi for all
p0 i  p00 i. This assumption implies that fairness payo¤s are small by com-
parison with monetary payo¤s which guarantees that prices are strategic
complements.3 Lemma 0, stated and proved formally in Appendix A, shows
that these assumptions imply that  r(u; p) is a supermodular game. By Mil-
grom and Roberts (1990) we know that if  r(u; p) is a supermodular game,
then there exist largest and smallest serially undominated strategies for each
3If the payo¤ function is di¤erentiable, then ui having increasing di¤erences in (pi; p i);
is equivalent to the assumption that the cross partial derivatives of ui with respect to pi
and pj for any player j, is non-negative, that is,
@2ui
@2pipj
=
@2i
@2pipj| {z }
0
+wij(pj ; p
f
ij)
@2j
@2pipj| {z }
0
+
@wij(pj ; p
f
ij)
@pj
@j
@pi
 0:
Note that if a player cares only about monetary payo¤s and if the payo¤ function is
di¤erentiable, then the increasing di¤erences assumption boils down to @
2i
@2pipj
> 0: In the
game with reciprocal players and di¤erentiable payo¤ functions, the assumption will be
satised if @
2i
@2pipj
> 0 and  is su¢ ciently small.
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player, pi and pi. Moreover, the strategy proles p and p are pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium proles. Thus, the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game is guaranteed. Let us further assume that ui has decreasing dif-
ferences in (pi; p
f
 i). The following result shows how playersperceptions of
the fair prices of the rivals inuence the extremal equilibrium prices of this
game.
Lemma 1: If  r(u; p) his a supermodular game and ui has decreasing dif-
ferences in (pi; p
f
 i) then, the smallest and the largest pure-strategy Nash
equilibria of  r(u; p), i.e., pnr and pnr, are nonincreasing functions of pf =
(pf 1; :::; p
f
 n).
Lemma 1 is a comparative statics result that characterizes the impact
that playersperceptions of the fair prices of their rivals have on the Nash
equilibrium prices of the stage game. This result says that the higher are
playersperceptions of what the fair prices of the rivals should be, the lower
will the equilibrium prices be. This happens because an increase in pf i shifts
the best reply of a reciprocal player i towards origin. In other words, the
higher player i perceives the fair price for the other players to be, the more
he would like to set a smaller price for any price of the other players. The
critical assumption that drives this result is that ui has decreasing di¤erences
in (pi; p
f
 i), that is, the marginal returns from increasing prices are decreasing
with a players perception of the fair prices of the rivals.4
Next we show how preferences for fairness and reciprocity change the out-
come of static price competition. To do that we compare the Nash equilibria
4If ui is di¤erentiable this assumption is equivalent to
@wij(pj ;p
f
ij)
@pfij
@j
@pi
< 0 for all j.
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of the stage game with self-interested players to that of the stage game with
reciprocal players. The ndings are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1:
(i) If reciprocal players believe that the fair prices of the rivals are at least
the largest equilibrium prices of the rivals in  s(; p), that is, pf i  pns i; for
all i, then (a) pnr  pns; and ui(pnr; pf i)  i(pns); and (b) pnr  pns and
ui(p
nr; pf i)  i(pns).
(ii) If reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the
smallest equilibrium prices of the rivals in  s(; p), that is, pf i  pns i; for
all i, then (c) pnr  pns; and ui(pnr; pf i)  i(pns); and (d) pnr  pns and
ui(p
nr; pf i)  i(pns).
This result tells us how fairness and reciprocity change the nature of static
price competition. Part (i) tells us that if reciprocal players believe that the
fair prices of the rivals are at least the largest equilibrium prices of the rivals
in the game with self-interested players, then prices set by reciprocators will
be lower than those set by self-interested players. In this case, fairness and
reciprocity lead to a more competitive outcome. In contrast, part (ii) tells us
that if reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most
the smallest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested
players, then prices set by reciprocators will be higher than those set by
self-interested players. In this case, fairness and reciprocity lead to a less
competitive outcome.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. When reciprocal players
believe that the fair prices of the rivals are at least the largest equilibrium
prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested players, the smallest and
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the largest Nash equilibria of the game with reciprocal players are negative
reciprocity states: reciprocal players expect their rivals to set unfair prices.
This implies that reciprocal players wish to punish their rivals. They do it
by setting a price lower than the price a self-interested player would set. The
lower equilibrium prices reduce playersmonetary payo¤s and in addition
lead to payo¤ losses due to the unkind behavior of the rivals. In contrast,
when reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals are at most the
smallest equilibrium prices of the rivals in the game with self-interested play-
ers, the smallest and the largest Nash equilibria of the game with reciprocal
players are positive reciprocity states: reciprocal players expect their rivals
to set kind prices. This implies that reciprocal players wish to reward their
rivals. They do it by setting a higher price than the price a self-interested
player would set. The higher equilibrium prices increase playersmonetary
payo¤s and in addition lead to payo¤ gains due to the kind behavior of the
rivals.
We now turn our attention to how fairness and reciprocity change the
nature of dynamic price competition. The repeated game payo¤ of strategy
pi = (p
1
i ; p
2
i ; :::) when rivals play strategies p i is given by
Ui(pi; p i; p
f
 i) =
1X
t=1
t 1i(p
t
i; p
t
 i) + 
X
j 6=i
1X
t=1
t 1wij(p
t
j; p
f
ij)j(p
t
i; p
t
 i)
(3.12)
97
CHAPTER 3. TACIT COLLUSION UNDER FAIRNESS AND
RECIPROCITY
When players use stationary strategies the repeated game payo¤ becomes
Ui(pi; p i; p
f
 i) =
1X
t=1
t 1i(pi; p i) + 
X
j 6=i
wij(pj; p
f
ij)
1X
t=1
t 1j(pi; p i)
=
1
1  
"
i(pi; p i) + 
X
j 6=i
wij(pj; p
f
ij)j(pi; p i)
#
=
1
1  ui(p; p i; p
f
 i): (3.13)
For the dynamic game with self-interested players,  s1(; p); we know
from Friedman (1971) that for a su¢ ciently high discount factor, there is
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of  s1(; p) at a collusive price p
c with
payo¤ (pc) where (pc) is any payo¤ which gives every player strictly more
than the payo¤ of the largest Nash equilibrium of  s(; p), that is, i(pc) >
i(p
ns), for all i. Lemma 2 applies this result to the dynamic game with
reciprocal players,  r1(u; p):
Lemma 2: If pfij 2 [pnsj ; pcj] for all i and j 6= i, then there is a su¢ ciently
high discount factor such that there exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of  r1(u; p) at p
c.
This result states that given the fair prices prole, pf , for any pc such
that the playerspayo¤s at the collusive prices are higher than their payo¤s
at the largest Nash equilibrium of the stage game, collusion can be sustained
by reciprocal players at the strategy prole pc. From now on we assume that
Nash punishments in  r1(u; p) and in  
s
1(; p) are either at the smallest or
largest pure strategy Nash equilibria of  r(u; p) and  s(; p), respectively.
Our next result shows that reciprocity facilitates collusion when there is
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price competition, marginal costs are constant, and players think that fair
prices of the rivals are at least the largest Nash prices of the stage game with
self-interested players and at most the collusive prices.
Proposition 2: Let i(pi; p i) = (pi ci)Di(pi; p i), and pfij 2 [pnsj ; pcj] for all
i and j 6= i. Then the critical (minimum) discount factor needed to sustain
collusion at pc is lower in  r1(u; p) than in  
s
1(; p), that is, 
r
pc < 
s
pc.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If players think that the fair
prices of the rivals are less than the collusive prices, then collusion becomes
a positive reciprocity state. In this case playersmonetary payo¤s from col-
lusion are the same as the ones obtained in the game with self-interested
players but in addition there are fairness payo¤ gains since players think
that their rivals are being kind. This e¤ect makes collusion more attractive
when players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.
Additionally, if players think that the fair prices of the rivals are greater
than the largest Nash equilibrium prices of the stage game with self-interested
players, then Nash reversion becomes a negative reciprocity state. This im-
plies that the punishment imposed after cheating occurs is more severe when
players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested. This happens be-
cause monetary payo¤s are lower than the payo¤s of self-interested players
and in addition there are fairness payo¤ loses since players think that the ri-
vals are being unkind. This e¤ect also makes collusion more attractive when
players are reciprocal than when they are self-interested.
Clearly, these two e¤ects make collusion more attractive to reciprocal
players than to self-interested ones. However, the unilateral single period
deviation payo¤ is higher with reciprocal players than with self-interested
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ones. This happens because the unilateral single period deviation payo¤ of
a reciprocal player also includes the benet that player derives from being
treated kindly by the rivals (the rivals are playing their collusive prices). This
e¤ect of fairness and reciprocity makes collusion less attractive to reciprocal
players than to self-interested ones. The assumption that monetary payo¤s
are large by comparison with fairness payo¤s implies that the increase in
collusive payo¤ is of rst-order whereas the increase in the unilateral single
period deviation payo¤ is of second-order.
3.4 Strategic Substitutes
We now show that fairness and reciprocity facilitate collusion in dynamic
quantity-setting games with grim trigger punishments. Thus, when players
are reciprocal, collusive action proles are easier to sustain not only when
playersactions are strategic complements but also when they are strategic
substitutes.
When playersactions are strategic substitutes a players incremental re-
turns from increasing his own action are decreasing in the rivals actions.
The canonical market game where playersactions are strategic substitutes
is quantity competition with products that are perfect substitutes. We use
this game to study the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion when
playersactions are strategic substitutes.
Assume that in each period player i chooses quantity, qi, and his payo¤
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in that period is given by
ui(qi; Q i) = i(qi; Q i) + wi(Q i; Q
f
 i)
P
j 6=i
j(qi; Q i); (3.14)
where i(qi; Q i) is the monetary payo¤ and wi(Q i; Q
f
 i)
P
j 6=i j(qi; Q i)
is the fairness payo¤, with  > 0. Player is monetary payo¤, i(qi; q i); is
the di¤erence between revenue and cost, that is,
i(qi; Q i) = Ri (qi; Q i)  Ci(qi)
= P (Q)qi   Ci(qi); (3.15)
where Ri(qi; Q i) is revenue, Ci(qi) is the cost of production, and P (Q) is
the inverse market demand with Q =
P
qi. We assume that P (Q) is strictly
positive on some bounded interval (0; Q) with P (Q) = 0 for Q  Q:We also
assume that P (Q) is twice continuously di¤erentiable with P 0(Q) < 0 (in the
interval for which P (Q) > 0): Playerscosts of production are assumed to be
twice continuously di¤erentiable with C 0i(qi)  0: It is also assumed that the
decreasing marginal revenue property holds, that is, P 0(Q) + P 00 (Q) qi  0;
and P 0(Q)   C 00i (qi) < 0. Furthermore, we assume that the weight that
player i places on the rivalsaggregate monetary payo¤s depends on player
is perception of the fair aggregate output of the rivals, Qf i; and on the
actual aggregate output of the rivals such that
wi(Q i; Q
f
 i)
8>>><>>>:
> 0 if Q i < Q
f
 i
= 0 if Q i = Q
f
 i
< 0 otherwise
; (3.16)
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where wi(Q i; QF i) is assumed to be di¤erentiable in both arguments with
@wi=@Q i < 0 and @wi=@QF i > 0: The rst condition in (3.16) expresses
positive reciprocity. If a player expects her rivals to produce less than her
perception of fair output, then she is willing to sacrice some of her prot to
increase the rivalsprots. The third condition in (3.16) expresses negative
reciprocity. If a player expects her rivals to produce more than her perception
of fair output, then she is willing to sacrice some of her prot to reduce the
rivalsprots.
Finally, we assume that monetary payo¤s are large by comparison with
fairness payo¤s otherwise best replies of reciprocal players in a static Cournot
oligopoly might no longer have a negative slope across all quantities.
Proposition 3: If  r(u; p) and  s(; p) satisfy the conditions stated and
Qf i 2 [Qc i; Qns i] for all i, then the critical (minimum) discount factor needed
to sustain collusion at qc is lower in  r1(u; q) than in  
s
1(; q), that is,
rqc < 
s
qc :
Proposition 3 shows that fairness and reciprocity also facilitate collusion
when playerschoices are strategic substitutes. It says that if players think
that the fair output of the rivals is at least the collusive output and at most
the equilibrium output of the rivals in static game with self-interested players,
then it is easier to sustain collusion when players are reciprocal than when
they are self-interested.
The intuition is similar to that of Proposition 2. If reciprocal players
think that the fair output of their rivals is greater than their collusive output,
then playing the collusive output is more attractive in the dynamic quantity-
setting game with reciprocal players than in the game with self-interested
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players. This happens because the collusive monetary payo¤s are the same
as the ones obtained in the game with self-interested players but in addition
there are payo¤ gains from positive reciprocity since reciprocal players think
that their rivals are being kind.
Additionally, if reciprocal players perceive that the fair output of their
rivals is smaller than the equilibrium output of the rivals in static game with
self-interested players, then the punishment imposed after cheating occurs
becomes more severe with reciprocal players than with self-interested players.
This happens because, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game with reciprocal
players becomes a negative reciprocity state. This is bad for players since it
reduces monetary payo¤s (by comparison with the monetary payo¤s of self-
interested players) and leads to payo¤ loses from negative reciprocity since
reciprocal players think that the rivals are being mean.
In contrast, the single period deviation payo¤ in the game with reciprocal
players is larger than the single period deviation payo¤ in the game with
self-interested players. This happens because the unilateral single period
deviation payo¤ of a reciprocal player also includes the benet that player
derives from being treated kindly by the rivals (the rivals are playing their
collusive outputs). However, this e¤ect is of second-order since monetary
payo¤s are large by comparison with fairness payo¤s.
3.5 Discussion
Our main results hold provided certain conditions are met. For example, we
rule out fairness concerns by the part of consumers. This assumption was
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made on methodological grounds, to better isolate the e¤ect of fairness and
reciprocity among rms on collusive outcomes.
We also rule out that rms have fairness considerations with respect to
consumers. Contrary to this assumption, Engel (2007) reports that when
subjects know that they are playing against human buyers (instead of simu-
lated demand), collusion rates decrease substantially. This might undermine
the e¤ects predicted by the model.
The assumption that Nash punishments are either at the smallest or
largest pure strategy Nash equilibria is essentially a technical condition. This
condition is necessary when the stage game has multiple equilibria since in a
supermodular game we can state unambiguous comparative static results for
the largest and the smallest Nash equilibria but not for other Nash equilibria.
So far the paper has indicated that fairness and reciprocity facilitate
collusion when players use Nash reversion to punish deviations. However,
Abreus (1988) theory of optimal punishments can be an alternative frame-
work of analysis.
The existence of penal code punishments gives necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for an outcome to be a subgame perfect equilibrium. On the
contrary, Nash reversion punishments give only su¢ cient conditions. This
is a problem since su¢ cient conditions do not prevent the existence of a
harsher punishment in the self-interested case, which is not a Nash reversion
punishment, such that the target payo¤ is a subgame perfect equilibrium for
a smaller discount factor in the self-interested case than in the reciprocity
case.
We have chosen to conduct the main analysis under Nash reversion pun-
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ishments because simple strategies are more appealing since it is not very re-
alistic that economic agents play complex strategies. Nevertheless, we show
in Appendix B that our ndings also extends to the optimal punishments
framework (we only analyze the dynamic price-setting market game since
the quantity-setting case is similar).
The intuition behind this result is as follows. First, the benet of devi-
ating today (the unilateral single period deviation payo¤minus the collusive
payo¤) when players use optimal punishments is the same as when they
use grim trigger punishments. We already know from Proposition 2 that
if monetary payo¤s are large by comparison with fairness payo¤s, then the
increase in the collusive payo¤ due to fairness considerations is of rst-order
whereas the increase in the unilateral single period deviation payo¤ is of
second-order. Thus, the benet of deviating is smaller for reciprocators than
for self-interested players no matter if players use optimal punishments or
grim trigger punishments.
Second, if reciprocal players think that the fair prices are smaller than the
collusive prices, then the prices set on the initial path are perceived as kind
behavior by the other players and lead to positive fairness payo¤s. Therefore,
when the prices of the initial path are set, the payo¤s for reciprocal players
are higher than those for self-interested players.
Third, it is well known that punishments are more severe when players
use optimal punishments than when they use Nash reversion strategies. If
reciprocal players think that the fair prices of the rivals are greater than the
largest Nash prices of the stage game with self-interested players, then seeing
the rivals setting punishment prices lower than Nash prices will be perceived
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as nastier behavior than seeing the rivals setting Nash prices. Therefore,
reciprocal players will set lower prices than self-interested players during the
punishment phase under optimal punishments.
The second and the third e¤ects imply that the cost of deviating (the
collusive payo¤minus the payo¤ of entering a punishment stage) is larger for
reciprocal players than for self-interested players when players use optimal
punishments.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on how fairness and reciprocity might
a¤ect market outcomes. Most of this literature has focused on the impact of
fairness concerns by consumers on welfare. Here we take a complementary
approach and focus instead on the role of fairness concerns among rms on
collusive behavior.
Our main departure from the standard model of rm behavior is the as-
sumption that managers in rms are motivated in part by personal animosity
or respecttowards a rival. Hence, rms might punish rivals who behave
unfairlytowards them and reward rivals who behave fairly.
We nd that fairness and reciprocity among rms can facilitate collusive
behavior. We show that this result is valid not only when playerschoices
are strategic complements but also when they are strategic substitutes. The
result also holds no matter if players use grim trigger punishments or opti-
mal punishments. Thus, fairness concerns among producers with reciprocal
preferences who interact repeatedly can have adverse welfare consequences
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for consumers.
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Appendix 3.A Proofs
Lemma 0: If (i) Pi is a compact interval in R, (ii) ui(pi; p i; pf i) is order
upper semi-continuous in pi for xed p i and order continuous in p i for a
xed pi, and ui(pi; p i; p
f
 i) has a nite upper bound, (iii) ui is supermodu-
lar in pi for xed p i, and (iv) ui(pi; p i; p
f
 i) has increasing di¤erences in
(pi; p i), then  r(u; p) is a supermodular game.
Proof of Lemma 0: According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), a game
 (u; x) is supermodular if (i) the choice set is a compact interval in R, (ii)
ui is order upper semi-continuous in xi for x i and order continuous in x i
for a xed xi, and it has a nite upper bound, (iii) ui is supermodular in xi
for xed x i, and (iv) ui has increasing di¤erences in (xi; x i).
The price stage game with reciprocal players  r(u; p) satises condition (i)
since it is never optimal for players to choose an innite price for any nite
quantity. We have assumed that ui also satises all the requirements of
condition (ii). Condition (iii) is satised since the choice variables of players
are scalars. Condition (iv) is satised if for any two aggregate actions of the
others p0 i; p
00
 i with p
0
 i  p00 i (product order) the di¤erence ui(pi; p0 i; P
f
i ) 
ui(pi; p
00
 i; P
f
i ) is increasing (or non-decreasing) in pi, which is assumed as
well. Therefore  r(u; p) is supermodular game. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: It is an application of Theorem 6 in Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) with a slight di¤erence. In their setting, the smallest and
largest pure strategy equilibria of the game depends on a scalar, but in our
model it depends on a vector. Nevertheless, the proof is immediate since
we propose the smallest and largest equilibria is nonincreasing with the fair
price perception for any player j, which is a scalar. As a result, if the vector
increases in every component, then the smallest and largest equilibria do not
increase. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: The stage game  s(; p) is obtained from the stage
game  r(u; p) by setting  = 0: Thus, if  r(u; p) is a supermodular game so
is  s(; p): This means that  s(; p) also has a smallest and a largest Nash
equilibria in pure-strategies. Denote these two equilibria by pns and pns,
respectively. Observe that if pf i = p
ns
 i then p
nr = pns = pn and ui(pn; p
f
 i) =
i(p
n) since wij(pnj ; p
f
ij) = 0 for all j: (i) If p
ns
 i < p
f
 i, then p
nr  pns by
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Lemma 1. These two inequalities imply pnr i < p
f
 i which together with (3.10)
imply wij(pnrj ; p
f
ij) < 0 for all j: But then it follows that ui(p
nr; pf i) < i(p
ns)
by the fact that wij(pnrj ; p
f
ij) < 0 for all j and i(p
nr)  i(pns) for all i.
Similarly, (ii) if pf i < p
ns
 i, then p
nr  pns by Lemma 1. These two inequalities
imply pf i < p
nr
 i which together with (3.10) imply wij(p
nr
j ; p
f
ij) > 0 for all j:
But then it follows that ui(pnr; p
f
 i) > i(p
ns) by the fact that wij(pnrj ; p
f
ij) > 0
for all j and i(pnr)  i(pns) for all i. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: If pfij 2 [pnsj ; pcj] for all i and j 6= i; then by (3.10)
wij(p
c
j; p
f
ij)  0 and wij(pnrj ; p
f
ij)  0; for all i and j 6= i: This in turn implies
that
ui(p
c; pf i)  i(pc): (3.17)
We also know that
i(p
c) > i(p
ns) > i(p
ns): (3.18)
If pfij  pnsj for all i and j 6= i; then we know from Proposition 1 that
ui(p
nr; pf i)  i(pns); and ui(pnr; p
f
 i)  i(pns) (3.19)
for all i. From (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19) we obtain
ui(p
c; pf i) > ui(p
nr; pf i) and ui(p
c; pf i) > ui(p
nr; pf i)
for all i, which by Friedman (1971) implies that there exists a su¢ ciently
high discount factor such that pc is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
 r(u; p): Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: By Friedman (1971) and Lemma 2, the assump-
tions made imply that pc is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of  s(; p)
and of  r(u; p): We want to show that the critical discount factor at which
pc can be sustained using grim trigger punishments in  r1(u; p) is lower than
the critical discount factor at which pc can be sustained using grim trigger
punishments in  s1(; p), that is, 
r
pc < 
s
pc. From (3.5) and (3.7) su¢ cient
conditions for rpc < 
s
pc are
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i; p
f
 i)  ui(pc; p
f
 i)  i(BRsi (pc i); pc i)  i(pc); (3.20)
109
CHAPTER 3. TACIT COLLUSION UNDER FAIRNESS AND
RECIPROCITY
and
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i; p
f
 i)  ui(pnr; p
f
 i)  i(BRsi (pc i); pc i)  i(pns); (3.21)
and at least one inequality holds strictly.
We start by showing that i(pi; p i) = (pi  ci)Di(pi; p i) and pfij  pcj for all
j 6= i imply that (3.20) is satised as a strict inequality. We have that
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i; p
f
 i)  ui(pc; p
f
 i) = i(BR
r
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i)  i(pc)
+ 
P
j 6=i
wij(p
c
j; p
f
ij)(p
c
j   cj)[Dj(BRri (pc i); pc i) Dj(pc)]
 i(BRri (pc i); pc i)  i(pc) < i(BRsi (pc i); pc i)  i(pc)
The equality is obtained from (3.8) and from the assumption i(pi; p i) =
(pi ci)Di(pi; p i): The weak inequality comes from the assumption that pfij 
pcj which implies wij(p
c
j; p
f
ij)  0; and the assumption that Dj is increasing
with pi which together with pdri < p
c
i imply Dj(BR
r
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i) Dj(pc) < 0.
The strict inequality comes from the fact that BRsi (p
c
 i) is the best-reply to
pc i by a self-interested player.
We now show that if pnsj  p
f
ij for all j 6= i and  is su¢ ciently small, then
(3.21) is satised. Rewrite (3.21) as
[ui(BR
r
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i; p
f
 i)  i(BRsi (pc i); pc i)] + [i(pns)  ui(pnr; p
f
 i)]  0:
From Proposition 1 we have that
i(p
ns)  ui(pnr; pf i):
If pnsj  p
f
ij for all j 6= i, then wij(pj; p
f
ij)  0 for all j 6= i. Taking a rst-order
Taylor series expansion of ui(BRri (p
c
 i); p
c
 i; p
f
 i) around  = 0 we obtain
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i; p
f
 i) 
i(BR
s
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i)) + [
P
j 6=i
wij(pj; p
f
ij)j(BR
s
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i)];
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which is equivalent to
ui(BR
r
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i; p
f
 i)  i(BRsi (pc i); pc i) 
[
P
j 6=i
wij(pj; p
f
ij)j(BR
s
i (p
c
 i); p
c
 i)]  0:
Thus rpc < 
s
pc : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We need to show that Qf i 2 [Qc i; Qns i] for all i,
implies rqc < 
s
qc ; where 
r
qc is the critical discount factor above which q
c can
be sustained in  r1(u; q) and 
s
qc is the critical discount factor above which
qc can be sustained in  s1(; q). From (3.5) and (3.7) su¢ cient conditions
are that
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
 i); Q
c
 i)  ui(qc)  i(BRsi (Qc i); Qc i)  i(qc) (3.22)
and
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
 i); Q
cs
 i)  ui(qnr)  i(BRsi (Qc i); Qcs i)  i(qns): (3.23)
(i) We start by showing that Qf i 2 [Qc i; Qns i] implies (3.22) is satised as a
strict inequality. We have that
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
 i); Q
c
 i)  ui(qc) = i(BRri (Qc i); Qc i)  i(qc)
+ wi(Q
c
 i; Q
f
 i)

P (BRri (Q
c
 i) +Q
c
 i)  P (Qc)

Qc i
 i(BRri (Qc i); Qc i)  i(qc) < i(BRsi (Qc i); Qc i)  i(qc)
The strict inequality follows from the fact that BRsi (Q
c
 i) is the best re-
ply to Qc i for self-interested players: If Q
c
 i  Q
f
 i then wi(Q
c
 i; Q
f
 i)  0:
Furthermore, Qf i  Qns i implies BRri (Qc i) > qci which in turn implies
P (BRri (Q
c
 i) +Q
c
 i) < P (Q
c); since P 0() < 0:
(ii) We now show that Qf i 2 [Qc i; Qns i] implies that (3.23) is satised.
Rewrite (3.23) as
[ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
 i); Q
c
 i)  i(BRsi (Qc i); Qc i)] + [i(qns)  ui(qnr)]  0:
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We have that
ui(q
nr) = i(q
nr) + wi(Q
nr
 i; Q
f
 i)
P
j 6=i
j(q
nr)  i(qns):
The inequality follows from wi(Qnr i; Q
f
 i)  0 and the fact that Q
f
 i  Qns i
implies qnsi  qnri and i(qnr)  i(qns), for all i: Taking a rst-order Taylor
series expansion of ui(BRri (Q
c
 i); Q
cs
 i) around  = 0 we have
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
 i); Q
c
 i) 
i(BR
s
i (Q
c
 i); Q
c
 i) + [wi(Q
c
 i; Q
f
 i)
P
j 6=i
j(BR
s
i (Q
c
 i); Q
c
 i)]:
which is equivalent to
ui(BR
r
i (Q
c
 i); Q
c
 i)  i(BRsi (Qc i); Qc i) 
[wi(Q
c
 i; Q
f
 i)
P
j 6=i
j(BR
s
i (Q
c
 i); Q
c
 i)]  0
since Qc i  Q
f
 i implies that wi(Q
c
 i; Q
f
 i)  0: Thus, Q
f
 i 2 [Qc i; Qns i] for
all i, implies rqc < 
s
qc . Q.E.D.
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Appendix 3.B Optimal Punishments
Abreu (1988) introduces a rule which consists of an initial path (that is an
innite stream of one period action proles) and punishments (that are also
innite streams for any deviation from the initial path or from a prescribed
punishment). He introduces the notion of simple strategy prole in which a
specic punishment takes place after any deviation for each particular player.
Thus, the simple strategy proles have a description of (n+1) paths for an n-
player game. On the other hand, an arbitrary strategy prole may consist of
innite amount of punishments and depends on complex history-dependent
formulas.
We begin by introducing additional notations and denitions, after we
show an optimal simple penal code exists. Finally, we state conditions under
which it is easier to sustain collusion with reciprocal players than with self-
interested ones under optimal punishments.
A pure strategy of player i is denoted i. Each i is a sequence of func-
tions, i(1); i(2); :::; i(t); :::, one for each t. The function for all periods
t determines player is action at t as a function of the actions of all play-
ers in previous periods. Formally, at t = 1; i(1) 2 Pi and for t = 2; 3; :::;
i(t) : P
t 1 ! Pi. Player is strategy set is denoted i, and the set of
strategy proles is denoted   1  2  ::: n.
A path (or punishment), eP , is a stream of action proles fp(t)g1t=1 and
let 
  P1 be the set of punishments. Any strategy prole  2  generates
a path denoted eP () = fp()(t)g1t=1, and it is dened as follows:
p()(1) = (1) and
p()(t) = (t)(p()(1); :::; (p()(t)).
Player is payo¤ from path eP 2 
 is given by vxi : 
! R for x = fr; sg such
that
vxi ( eP ) =  P1t=1 tui(p(t)) if x = rP1
t=1 
ti(p(t)) if x = s
(3.24)
where ui is given by (3.8) and (3.10). Player is payo¤ function is given byevxi : ! R such that evxi () = vi( eP ()).
Abreu (1988) introduces the simple strategy prole, which is dened by
(n+1)-vector of paths ( eP 0; eP 1; :::; eP n) and a rule. The initial path is eP 0, and
for each player i 2 f1; :::; ng; eP i is the punishment for player i. Any unilateral
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deviation of player i from the ongoing path is responded by imposing eP i. If
more than one player deviate, the ongoing path continues to be followed and
deviators will not be punished. Formally:
Let eP i 2 
; i = 0; 1; :::; n. The simple strategy prole ( eP 0; eP 1; :::; eP n)
species: (i) play eP 0 until some player deviates unilaterally from eP 0; (ii)
for any j 2 f1; :::; ng, play eP j if the jth player deviates unilaterally from eP i,
i = 0; 1; :::; n, where eP i is an ongoing previously specied path; continue witheP i if no deviations occur or if two or more players deviate simultaneously.
A simple strategy ( eP 0; eP 1; :::; eP n) prole is perfect if and only if no one-
shot deviation by any player j 2 f1; :::; ng from eP i, i = 0; 1; :::; n; yields player
j a higher payo¤, when all players conform with eP j after the deviation.5 Let
p denote the set of perfect equilibrium strategy proles of  1(). The
perfect equilibrium paths 
p = f eP ()j 2 pg, and payo¤s V = fv( eP )j eP 2

pg.
We introduce three more denitions from Abreu (1988) before stating the
existence result. An optimal penal code is an n-vector of the strategy proles
f1; :::; ng such that for all i,
i 2 p and evi(i) = minfevi()j 2 pg.
Let i( eP 1; :::; eP n) = ( eP i; eP 1; :::; eP n). The simple penal code ( eP 1; :::; eP n) is
the n-vector of the strategy proles 1( eP 1; :::; eP n); :::; n( eP 1; :::; eP n): Finally,
a simple penal code ( eP 1; :::; eP n) is an optimal simple penal code if it is an
optimal penal code.
Lemma 3: If p is non-empty, P is a compact topological space and given
pf , u : P  pf ! Rn is continuous, then an optimal simple penal code exists.
Proof of Lemma 3: The lemma follows from Abreu (1988) under the
assumptions of u(:). Q.E.D.
Similarly, an optimal simple penal code exists for a continuous payo¤
function  : P ! Rn. Let present discounted value of player is payo¤s from
the period t+ 1 to 1 along the path eP be
vxi ( eP ; t+ 1) =  P1k=1 kui(p(t+ k)) if x = rP1
k=1 
ki(p(t+ k)) if x = s
(3.25)
5This relation holds if the set of payo¤s of the stage game is bounded (i.e. fu(p)jp 2 Pg
is bounded).
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and player is payo¤ under her optimal penal code, vxi = evxi (i). The follow-
ing result indicates the use of optimal penal code to characterize the set of
perfect equilibrium paths.
Lemma 4: If an optimal penal code exists, then eP 0 2 
p if and only if
ui(p
dr
i ; p
0
 i(t))  ui(p0)  vri ( eP 0; t+ 1)  vri (3.26)
i(p
ds
i ; p
0
 i(t))  i(p0)  vsi ( eP 0; t+ 1)  vsi (3.27)
Proof of Lemma 4: The lemma follows from Abreu (1988). Q.E.D.
The left-hand-side of inequalities (3.26) and (3.27) are the benet of de-
viating today for reciprocators and self interested players, respectively. The
right-hand-side is the cost of deviating. Observe that the prices in each
period of the initial path can be considered as any collusive prices.
Since the existence of optimal simple penal code is guaranteed under
the given assumptions, our nal result shows that fairness and reciprocity
facilitate collusion when players use optimal simple penal codes.
Proposition 5: Assume (i) ui has decreasing di¤erences in (pi; p
f
 i), for all
i; (ii) i(pi; p i) = (pi   ci)Di(pi; p i); and (iii) pfij 2 [pnsj ; pcj] for all i and
j 6= i: Let p0 satisfy i(po) > i(pns) for all i: If an optimal simple penal code
exist, then the critical (minimum) discount level to sustain collusion at eP 0is
lower in the game with reciprocal players  r1(n; u; p; P
f ) than in the game
with self-interested players  s1(n; ; p), that is 
r
p0 < 
s
p0.
Proof of Proposition 5: The minimum critical discount factor will be
obtained if the inequality (3.26) and (3.27) hold with equality respectively for
reciprocators and self-interested players, otherwise the discount factor can be
decreased by a small amount without violating the inequality. In Proposition
3, we proved the LHS of the equations being smaller for reciprocators, hence
a smaller discount level is possible for the reciprocators. In addition, the
following condition is immediate
vri ( eP 0; t+ 1)  vsi ( eP 0; t+ 1) (3.28)
considering the initial path where each player i sets at least the collusive price
pci for each stage, until one deviates. Hence for any fair price perception
pfij 2 [pnsj ; pcj] for all i and j 6= i, the prices set at the initial path will be
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perceived as kind behavior, thus the condition holds. Note that, if the prices
set at the initial path are equal to collusive prices pci for each player i and
pfij = p
c
j for all i and i 6= i, then the condition holds with equality. Finally,
to complete the proof we need to compare the payo¤ of any player i in the
optimal penal code vxi . In the optimal penal code, the players punish the
deviated player i via playing a pure strategy prole i 2 p, which gives the
lowest possible payo¤to player i. Let nx denote the strategy prole where in
each stage players set Nash prices. Since nx 2 p, in each stage the optimal
penal code for player i, vxi , is at least as severe as
nx, which means that the
optimal punishment of player j in the reciprocity case, p
j
, satises p
j
 pnsj .
Note that, if the prices set in the penal code are such that p
j
= pnsj = p
f
ji for
all j and i 6= j, then the payo¤s from the penal code are equal for reciprocal
and self-interested players, that is, vri = v
s
i . Otherwise, the reciprocal players
perceive the unkind behavior of their rivals and negative reciprocity implies
the payo¤under the optimal penal code is harsher for reciprocal players than
self-interested players, that is vri < v
s
i . Hence 
r
p0 < 
s
p0. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 4
Experimental Cournot
Oligopoly and Inequity
Aversion
This paper explores the role of inequity aversion as an explanation for ob-
served behavior in experimental Cournot oligopoly. We show that inequity
aversion can change the nature of the strategic interaction: quantities are
strategic substitutes for su¢ ciently asymmetric output levels but strategic
complements otherwise. We nd that inequity aversion can explain why:
(i) some experiments result in higher than Cournot-Nash production levels
while others result in lower, (ii) collusion often occurs with only two play-
ers whereas with three or more players market outcomes are very close to
Cournot-Nash, and (iii) players often achieve equal prots in asymmetric
Cournot oligopoly.
Keywords: Inequity Aversion; Cournot Oligopoly; Experiments.
JEL Classication Numbers: D43, D63, L13, L21.
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4.1 Introduction
Although quantity-setting oligopoly is one of the workhorse modelsof in-
dustrial organization, experimentally there is much ambiguity about its out-
come. A recent survey by Georgantzis (2006) indicates that many experi-
mental Cournot oligopoly games reject the hypothesis that the outcome is in
line with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot game.
Interestingly, however, outcomes on both sides of the Cournot-Nash outcome
are found: some experiments result in higher than Cournot-Nash production
levels while others result in lower production levels (Holt, 1995).1
Why does the theory perform poorly in the experiments? One possibility
is that players are averse to inequality in earnings, that is, they are concerned
about their own material payo¤but also about the consequences of their acts
on payo¤ distributions.
Inequity aversion has been shown to explain a broad range of data for
many di¤erent games. The clearest evidence for these type of preferences
comes from bargaining and trust games. For example, in ultimatum games
o¤ers are usually much more generous than predicted by equilibrium, and
low o¤ers are often rejected. According to the inequity aversion explanation,
these o¤ers are consistent with an equilibrium in which players make o¤ers
knowing that other players may reject allocations that appear unfair.2
1A rather general nding in nitely-repeated symmetric experimental Cournot
oligopoly is that, while some learning occurs during the session, in many sessions total
output is not signicantly di¤erent from the collusive prediction, while in other sessions,
total output oscilates between the collusive and the Cournot outcome. Additionally, in
nitely-repeated asymmetric experimental Cournot oligopoly, subjectsstrategies fail to
converge towards the Nash equilibrium prediction. See Rassenti et al. (2000) and Huck
et al. (2000, 2001).
2Camerer (2003) and Sobel (2005) provide excellent reviews of this literature.
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In this paper we study formally the role of inequity aversion on Cournot
competition. We assume that a player cares about her own monetary payo¤
and, in addition, would like to reduce the di¤erence between her payo¤ and
those of her rivals. More specically, a inequity averse player dislikes advan-
tageous inequity: she feels compassion towards her rivals when the average
material payo¤ of her rivals is smaller than her own material payo¤. Addi-
tionally, an inequity averse player also dislikes disadvantageous inequity: she
feels envy towards her rivals when the average material payo¤ of her rivals
is greater than her own material payo¤.
We nd that inequity aversion can change the nature of the strategic
interaction: quantities are strategic substitutes when players choose asym-
metric output levels but strategic complements when they choose similar
output levels. This can give rise to a continuum of equilibria. We show that
the set of Nash equilibria of Cournot competition with inequity averse play-
ers changes monotonically with compassion and envy. If playersdegree of
envy increases, then the largest Nash equilibria of the Cournot game moves
closer to the Walrasian outcome. In contrast, if playersdegree of compas-
sion increases, then the smallest Nash equilibria of the Cournot game moves
closer to the collusive outcome. However, as the number of players grows
the impact of inequity aversion vanishes. This happens because it takes only
one self-interested player to destroy the continuum of equilibria generated by
inequity aversion.
We nd that relatively low levels of inequity aversion generate less asym-
metries in prots than those predicted when self-interested players play asym-
metric Cournot oligopolies. We also show that relatively high levels of in-
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equity aversion can explain why often players attain equal prots in asymmet-
ric experimental Cournot oligopolies. The intuition for this result is straight-
forward. For relatively high levels of inequity aversion, attaining asymmetric
prots imposes inequity costs that are too high in relation to the material
benets.
This paper is related to a recent strand of literature in economics that
studies the consequences of relaxing the assumption of pure self interest. Ra-
bin (1993) is the rst using fairness considerations in game theory. Sapping-
ton and Desiraju (2007) study inequity aversion in adverse selection contexts.
Biel (2008) studies how the optimal incentive contract in team production
is a¤ected when workers are averse to inequity. Santos-Pinto (2008) shows
that inequity aversion is able to organize several experimental regularities of
endogenous timing games. Englmaier and Wambach (2010) study optimal
contracts when the agent su¤ers from being better o¤ or worse o¤ than the
principal.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets-up the model. Section
3 characterizes equilibria of Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and in-
equity averse players. Section 4 considers Cournot oligopoly with asymmetric
costs. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
4.2 The Model
Many experiments indicate that individuals are motivated not only by ma-
terial self-interest, but also by the distribution of payo¤s. We incorporate
this possibility in the Cournot oligopoly game by assuming that players are
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averse to inequality in prots.
There are two main theories of inequity aversion: Fehr and Schmidts
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). According to Fehr and Schmidt
a player cares about his own payo¤ and dislikes absolute payo¤ di¤erences
between his own payo¤ and the payo¤ of any other player.3
According to Bolton and Ockenfelss (2000) an inequity averse player is
concerned with both his own payo¤ and his relative share of the total group
payo¤. So, a player would be equally happy if all players received the same
payo¤ or if some were rich and some were poor as long as he received the
average payo¤, while according to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) he would clearly
prefer that all players get the same.4
We follow Fehr and Schmidts (1999) approach to model inequity aversion.
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with n players where the prot of player i is
the di¤erence between revenue and cost, that is,
i(qi; Q i) = Ri (qi; Q i)  Ci(qi) = P (Q)qi   Ci(qi); (4.1)
where Ri(qi; Q i) is revenue, Ci(qi) is the cost of production, and P (Q) is
the inverse market demand with Q =
P
qi. We assume that P (Q) is strictly
positive on some bounded interval (0; Q) with P (Q) = 0 for Q  Q:We also
assume that P (Q) is twice continuously di¤erentiable with P 0(Q) < 0 (in
the interval for which P (Q) > 0): Players costs of production are assumed to
3Neilson (2000) provides an axiomatic foundation for Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
4Bolton and Ockenfelss (2000) payo¤ function is Ui() = v(i; i=
Pn
j=1 j); where v
is assumed to be globally non-decreasing and concave in the rst argument, to be strictly
concave in the second argument (relative payo¤), and to satisfy v(i; 1=n) = 0 for all
i. This type of inequity aversion has no impact on equilibrium outcomes in symmetric
Cournot games. This result is driven by the assumption that v(i; 1=n) = 0 for all i.
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be twice continuously di¤erentiable with C 0i(qi)  0: It is also assumed that
the decreasing marginal revenue property holds, that is, P 0(Q)+P 00 (Q) qi <
0 (this implies that quantities are strategic substitutes). Furthermore, we
assume that P 0(Q)   C 00i (qi)  0 (this implies the prot function is strictly
concave).
According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the payo¤ function of player i is
Ui(i;  i) = i  
"
i
n  1
P
j 6=i
max (j   i; 0) +
i
n  1 max
P
j 6=i
(i   j; 0)
#
:
(4.2)
The terms in the square bracket are the payo¤ e¤ects of compassion i
and envy i. We see that if player is prots are greater than the average
prots of its rivals then player i feels compassion towards its rivals. However,
if player is prots are smaller than the average prots of its rivals then player
i feels envious of his rivals.5 This model of inequity aversion has piecewise
linear indi¤erence curves over a players own prots and its rivalsprots.
Player is inequity aversion towards its rivals is characterized by the pair of
parameters (i; i) ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
6 player i exhibits strict inequity aversion
when both i and i are strictly greater than zero. player i only cares about
maximizing prots when i = i = 0: In all other cases player is (weakly)
averse to inequity. We assume that i and i; i = 1; : : : ; n; are common
knowledge. Let  = (1; : : : ; n) and  = (1; : : : ; n) :
Fehr and Schmidt assume that the dislike of disadvantageous inequity
5When there are only two players in the market, player is payo¤ function becomes
Ui(i; j) = i   [imax (j   i; 0) + imax (i   j ; 0)] ; i 6= j = 1; 2:
6Alternatively, we could have assumed that player i has di¤erent feelings of compassion
and envy towards each rival. To simplify the analysis, we assume that player i feels the
same degree of compassion and envy towards all rivals.
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is stronger than that of advantageous inequity, i.e. i > i and that i is
smaller than 1. We make no assumptions about the relation between i and
i but we assume, like Fehr and Schmidt, that i is smaller than 1.
4.3 Equilibria with Symmetric Costs
In this section we characterize the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot
oligopoly with symmetric costs. Our rst result characterizes the best reply
of an inequity averse player.
Proposition 1: The best reply of player i in a Cournot oligopoly with
symmetric costs and inequity averse players is
ri(Q i) =
8>>><>>>:
si(Q i); if 0  Q i  (n  1)q(i)
Q i
n 1 ; if (n  1)q (i)  Q i  (n  1)q(i)
ti(Q i); if (n  1)q(i)  Q i
; (4.3)
where
si(Q i) = argmax
qi
"
(1  i)i(qi; Q i) +
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
j(qi; Q i)
#
;(4.4)
ti(Q i) = argmax
qi
"
(1 + i)i(qi; Q i) 
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
j(qi; Q i)
#
;(4.5)
q(i) is the solution to (1  i) [P (nq)  C 0(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0; and q(i) is
the solution to (1 + i) [P (nq)  C 0(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0:
The best reply has three di¤erent segments. When the rivals produce low
output levels the best reply has a negative slope and consists of a smaller
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output than the output of a self-interested player due to compassion. How-
ever, when the rivals produce intermediate output levels the best reply has
a positive slope and consists in producing the average output level of the
rivals. Finally, when the rivals produce high output levels the best reply
has a negative slope and consists of a larger output level than the output a
self-interested player due to envy.
We see that the best reply of an inequity averse player is continuous like
the best reply of self-interested player. However, the best reply of an in-
equity averse player is non-monotonic whereas a self-interested player has a
monotonic best reply. Thus, under inequity aversion quantities are strate-
gic substitutes over low and high output levels of the rivals but strategic
complements over intermediate output levels of the rivals.
Proposition 2: The set of Nash equilibria of a Cournot oligopoly with
symmetric costs and inequity averse players is
N IA = f(q1; : : : ; qn) : qi = qj; 8i 6= j; and q()  qi  q(); i = 1; : : : ; ng ;
where q() = max [q (1) ; : : : ; q(n)] ; and q() = min [q(1); : : : ; q(n)] :
Proposition 2 tells us that if all players are averse to inequity, then there
is a continuum of equilibria in a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs.
The smallest Nash equilibrium is determined by the preferences of the player
with the highest level of compassion and the largest Nash equilibrium is
determined by the preferences of the player with the lowest level of envy.
Proposition 2 also tells that the market output with inequity averse players
may be higher or lower than the market output with self-interested players.
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This depends on playersdegree of envy and compassion.
Proposition 3: The smallest Nash equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly with
symmetric costs and inequity averse players is a nonincreasing function of
: The largest Nash equilibrium is a nondecreasing function of :
This result characterizes the impact of compassion and envy on the set
of Nash equilibria of the Cournot oligopoly with inequity averse players. It
tells us that an increase in compassion reduces the market output produced
in the smallest Nash equilibria with inequity averse players. This result is
quite intuitive. In fact, Fehr and Schmidts (1999) payo¤ function implies
that if player i has a higher monetary payo¤ than the average payo¤ of his
opponents and i = 1=2; then player i is just as willing to keep one dollar to
himself as to give it to his rivals. If all players have similar preferences, then
they act as if they are maximizing the joint prot,
P
i: So, if i = 1=2;
for all i, then compassion leads to the best collusive outcome.7 In contrast,
an increase in envy raises the market output produced in the largest Nash
equilibria with inequity averse players.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that inequity aversion can change qualitatively
the predictions of a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. In the benchmark game
with self-interested players (i = i = 0; for all i) there is a unique Nash
7Experimental evidence shows that the amount of collusion observed in repeated
Cournot oligopoly depends on communication, playing with the same rival(s) and the
size of the market. Daughety and Forsythe (1987a,1987b) report that face to face non-
binding groups discussions increase price in repeated Cournot games in which the quantity
decision are made afterwards. Similarly, Isaac et al. (1984) report that posted-o¤er prices
are increased when sellers are given chance to meet face to face prior to each period. Holt
(1985) nds that collusion occurs only when the same subjects are matched in xed groups
for the entire experiment. With random matching the Cournot-Nash solution is a good
prediction.
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equilibrium. Proposition 2 shows that inequity aversion can give rise to a mul-
tiplicity of symmetric equilibria. Proposition 3 shows that compassion can
generate collusive outcomes in Cournot markets whereas envy can generate
perfectly competitive outcomes. The existence of a multiplicity of equilib-
ria might be the reason why in many experiments with Cournot duopolies
outcomes fall on both sides of the Cournot prediction and may range from
perfectly collusive to relatively competitive (Holt, 1995).
Huck et al. (2004) review the literature on the role of the number of
players on the outcome of Cournot oligopolies with symmetric costs. They
nd that (pp. 440) (...) collusion sometimes occurs in duopolies and is
very rare in markets with more than two rms. On average, total outputs in
markets with more than two rms slightly exceed the Cournot prediction.
They also test for number e¤ects in oligopoly in a unied economic frame and
nd that (pp. 443) collusion sometimes occurs with two rms. For three-
rm oligopolies Nash equilibrium seems to be a good predictor. Markets with
four or more rms are never collusive and typically settle around the Cournot
outcome while some of them are very competitive with outputs close to the
Walrasian outcome.Our next result shows that these ndings are consistent
with our model.
Proposition 4: Assume that i and i; for all i; are drawn from a uni-
form distribution with support on [0; 1] : As the number of players increases
the set of Nash equilibria of a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and in-
equity averse players converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of a Cournot
oligopoly with symmetric costs and self-interested players.
This result shows that increasing the number of players reduces the im-
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pact of inequity aversion on the set of Nash equilibria of a Cournot oligopoly
with symmetric costs. This happens because when there are n players, the
smallest Nash equilibrium of the game is determined by the preferences of
the player with the lowest degree of compassion. Similarly, the largest Nash
equilibrium of the game is determined by the player with the lowest degree
of envy. If the levels of compassion and envy of each player are drawn from
a uniform distribution with support on [0; 1] ; then an increase in the num-
ber of players makes it more likely that the lowest level of compassion as
well as the lowest level of envy are both very close to zero. Thus, as the
number of players increases the smallest and the largest Nash equilibria of
a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and inequity averse players con-
verge to the Nash equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs
and self-interested players.
4.4 Equilibria with Asymmetric Costs
In this section we analyze the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot oligopoly
with asymmetric costs. To simplify the analysis let n = 2. Furthermore, sup-
pose that there are no xed costs and that player 1 has a lower marginal cost
than player 2, that is, C 01(q) < C
0
2(q) for all q.
Players will attain equal prots when 1(q1; q2) = 2(q1; q2) or
P (q1 + q2)(q2   q1) = C2(q2)  C1(q1): (4.6)
Denote the solution of (4.6) with respect to qi as qi = ei(qj): The slope of
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the equal prot curve is
dq2
dq1
=
MR1   C 01   P 0q2
MR2   C 02   P 0q1
: (4.7)
We see from (4.7) that if (q1; q2) is a point in the equal prot curve that
satises MR1   C 01   P 0q2 > 0 and MR2   C 02   P 0q1 > 0; then the slope of
the equal prot curve at that point is well-dened and positive. We assume
from now on that the cost asymmetry is not too high such that the equal
prot curve has a positive slope at all points (q1; q2) with q2 > q1.
Proposition 5: The best reply of player i in a Cournot duopoly with asym-
metric costs and inequity averse players is
ri(qj) =
8>>><>>>:
si(qj); if 0  qj  ej(qi(i))
ei(qj); if ej(qi (i))  qj  ej(qi(i))
ti(qj); if ej(qi(i))  qj
; (4.8)
where
si(qj) = argmax
qi
[(1  i)i(qi; qj) + ij(qi; qj)] ; (4.9)
ti(qj) = argmax
qi
[(1 + i)i(qi; qj)  ij(qi; qj)] ; (4.10)
qi(i) is the solution to
(1  i) [P 0(qi + ej(qi))qi + P (qi + ej(qi))  C 0i(qi)]
+ iP
0(qi + ej(qi))ej(qi) = 0;
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and qi(i) is the solution to
(1 + i) [P
0(qi + ej(qi))qi + P (qi + ej(qi))  C 0i(qi)]
  iP 0(qi + ej(qi))ej(qi) = 0:
We see from (4.3) and (4.8) that the best reply of an inequity averse player
in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs is qualitatively similar to the
best reply of an inequity averse player in a Cournot duopoly with symmetric
costs. Quantities are strategic substitutes for low and high output levels
of the rival but strategic complements for intermediate output levels of the
rival. The only di¤erence is that for intermediate output levels inequity
averse players wish to equalize prots. Since costs are asymmetric it is not
possible to equalize prots by producing the same output level of as the rival.
Thus, players will choose di¤erent output levels to equalize prots.
Proposition 6: Consider a Cournot duopoly where player 1 has lower mar-
ginal cost than player 2 and players are inequity averse. If 1 and 2 are suf-
ciently small, that is, q1(1)  e1(q2(2)), then this game has a unique Nash
equilibrium (qIA1 ; q
IA
2 ); which is the solution to q1 = s1(q2) and q2 = t2(q1):
In this equilibrium: (i) player 1 feels compassion of player 2, (ii) player 2
feels envy of player 1, and (iii) qS2 < q
IA
2 < q
IA
1 < q
S
1 , where (q
S
1 ; q
S
2 ) is the
Nash equilibrium of the game with self-interested players.
This result says that if the low cost player has a small dislike of ad-
vantageous inequity and the high cost player has a small dislike of disad-
vantageous inequity, then the Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs and
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inequity averse players has an asymmetric Nash equilibrium where the low
cost player attains a higher prot than the high cost player. Furthermore,
the inequity averse low cost player chooses a lower output level than a low
cost self-interested player and the inequity averse high cost player chooses a
higher output than a high cost self-interested player. The intuition behind
this result is as follows.
A low cost player with a small dislike of advantageous inequity chooses
a lower output than a low cost self-interested player because she knows that
in equilibrium she will attain higher prots than her rival and this induces
compassion towards the rival. A high cost player with a small dislike of disad-
vantageous inequity chooses a higher output than a high cost self-interested
player because he knows that in equilibrium he will attain lower prots than
his rival and this induces envy towards the rival.
Proposition 7: Consider a Cournot duopoly where player 1 has lower mar-
ginal cost than player 2 and players are inequity averse. If 1 and 2 are
su¢ ciently large, that is, q1(1) < e1(q2(2)), then the set of Nash equilibria
of this game is
N IA = f(q1; q2) : 1(q1; q2) = 2(q1; q2); and q()  q1  q()g ; (4.11)
where q() = max [q1 (1) ; e1(q2(2))] ; and q() = min [q1(1); e1(q2(2))] :
Proposition 7 tells us that if the low cost player has a high dislike of
advantageous inequity and the high cost player has a high dislike of disad-
vantageous inequity, then the Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs and
inequity averse players has a continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria where
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players attain equal prots.
Propositions 6 and 7 are consistent with experimental evidence on Cournot
oligopolies with asymmetric costs. Keser (1993) studies two stage duopoly
games with asymmetric costs and demand inertia. She nds that the high
cost player has higher prots and the low cost player lower prots than the
self-interested subgame perfect equilibrium prots. Selten et al. (1997) study
a 20-period repeated Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs and nd that
players often try to achieve equal prots.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot competition.
We nd that inequity aversion can change the nature of the strategic inter-
action: quantities are strategic substitutes when players choose asymmetric
output levels but strategic complements when they choose similar output
levels. We show that inequity aversion is able to organize at least three
behavioral regularities in experimental Cournot oligopoly.
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Appendix 4.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The quantity q(i) is the interception of ti(Q i)
with the 45 degree line. From the denition of ti(Q i) we have
(1 + i) [P
0(Q)qi + P (Q)  C 0(qi)] 
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
P 0(Q)qj = 0:
In a symmetric equilibrium we have q1 = ::: = qn = q: So,
(1 + i) [P
0(nq)q + P (nq)  C 0(q)]  iP 0(nq)q = 0:
or
(1 + i) [P (nq)  C 0(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0:
Similarly, the quantity q(i) is the interception of si(Q i) with the 45 degree
line. From the denition of si(Q i) we have
(1  i) [P 0(Q)qi + P (Q)  C 0(qi)] +
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
P 0(Q)qj = 0:
In a symmetric equilibrium we have q1 = ::: = qn = q: So,
(1  i) [P 0(nq)q + P (nq)  C 0(q)] + iP 0(nq)q = 0:
or
(1  i) [P (nq)  C 0(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0:
We now show that q(i) is an increasing function of i and q(i) a decreasing
function of i for i = 1; : : : ; n: Let
h(q; i) = (1 + i) [P (nq)  C 0(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0;
g(q; i) = (1  i) [P (nq)  C 0(q)] + P 0(nq)q = 0;
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which imply
@q
@i
=  @h=@i
@h=@q
=   P (Q)  C
0(q)
(1 + n(1 + i))P 0(Q) + nP 00(Q)q   C 00i (q)
> 0;
@q
@i
=  @g=@i
@g=@q
=     [P (Q)  C
0(q)]
(1 + n(1  i))P 0(Q) + nP 00(Q)q   C 00i (q)
< 0;
since P 0(Q) < 0; P 0(Q)  0; and C 00(qi)  0:
We will now show that qi = 1n 1
P
j 6=i qj is a best response for player i when
the rivals produce
qNi  qj  q(i); (4.12)
where qj = 1n 1
P
j 6=i qj: To do that we will show that player i can not gain
from deviating from qi = qj when (4.12) holds. Suppose, that (4.12) holds
and that player i produces qi = qj + "; with " > 0: In this case player is
payo¤ is
Ui = (1  i) [P (Q) qi   C(qi)] +
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj   C(qj)]
and the change in player is payo¤ from producing qi = qj + "; " > 0; instead
of qj is approximately equal to
dUi  (1  i) [P 0 (Q) qi + P (Q)  C 0(qi)] +
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
P 0 (Q) qj

qi=qj
(")
= [(P 0 (nqj) qj + P (nqj)  C 0(qj))  i (P (nqj)  C 0(qj))] ":
The square brackets are negative since qi = qj > argmax [P (Q) qi   C(qi)]
and P (nqj)   C 0(qj) > 0: So, when (4.12) holds, player i can not gain by
producing more than qj: Now, suppose that (4.12) holds and that player i
produces qi = qj + "; with " < 0: In this case player is payo¤ is
Ui = (1 + i) [P (Q) qi   C(qi)] 
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj   C(qj)] ;
and the change in player is payo¤ from producing qi = qj + "; " < 0; instead
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of qj is approximately equal to
dUi  (1 + i) [P 0 (Q) qi + P (Q)  C 0(qi)] 
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
P 0 (Q) qj

qi=qj
(")
= [(1 + i) [P (nqj)  C 0(qj)] + P 0(nqj)qj] " = h(q; i)jq=qj (") :
Since " < 0, we have that sign dUi =  sign h(q; i)jq=qj : If qj = q(i) we
have that sign dUi = 0: If qNi  qj < q(i); the fact h(q; i) is a decreasing
function of q implies that h(q; i)jq=qj > 0; which in turn implies that sign
dUi < 0: So, when (4.12) holds, player i can not gain by producing less than
qj: From this result is follows immediately that if player is rivals produce
q(i) <
1
n 1
P
j 6=i qj; then the best response of player i is given by ti(q i):
We will now show that qi = 1n 1
P
j 6=i qj is a best response for player i when
the rivals produce
q(i)  qj  qNi ; (4.13)
To do that we will show that player i can not gain from deviating from
qi = qj when (4.13) holds. Suppose, that (4.13) holds and that player i
produces qi = qj + "; with " < 0: In this case player is payo¤ is given by
Ui = (1 + i) [P (Q) qi   C(qi)] 
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj   C(qj)] ;
and the change in player is payo¤ from producing qi = qj + "; " < 0; instead
of qj is approximately equal to
dUi  (1 + i) [P 0 (Q) qi + P (Q)  C 0(qi)] 
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
P 0 (Q) qj

qi=qj
(")
= [(1 + i) [P
0(nqj)qj + P (nqj)  C 0(qj)]  iP 0(nqj)qj] ":
The square brackets are positive since qi = qj < argmax [P (Q) qi   C(qi)]
and P 0(nqj) < 0: So, when (4.13) holds, player i can not gain by producing
less than qj: Now, suppose that (4.13) holds and that player i produces
qi = qj + "; with " > 0: In this case player is payo¤ is given by
Ui = (1  i) [P (Q) qi   C(qi)] +
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
[P (Q) qj   C(qj)]
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and the change in player is payo¤ from producing qi = qj + "; " > 0; instead
of qj is approximately equal to
dUi  (1  i) [P 0 (Q) qi + P (Q)  C 0(qi)] +
i
n  1
X
j 6=i
P 0 (Q) qj

qi=qj
(")
= [(1  i) [P (nqj)  C 0(qj)] + P 0 (nqj) qj] " = g(q; i)jq=qj (") :
Since " > 0; we have that sign dUi = sign g(q; i)jq=qj : If qj = q(i) we
have that sign dUi = 0: If q(i) < qj  qNi ; the fact g(q; i) is a decreasing
function of q implies that g(q; i)jq=qj < 0; which in turn implies that sign
dUi < 0: So, when (4.13) holds, player i can not gain by producing more than
qj: From this result is follows immediately that if player is rivals produce
0  1
n 1
P
j 6=i qj < q(i); then the best response of player i is given by
si(q i): Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof proceeds in two steps. First we show
that the set of equilibria is non-empty. Second, we show that if all players
are strictly averse to inequality, then there is a continnum of equilibria and
we characterize the largest and the smallest one.
We now show that qi = qNi is the best reply to q
N
 i =
 
qN1 ; : : : ; q
N
i 1; q
N
i+1; : : : q
N
n

in the Cournot oligopoly with symmetric costs and inequity averse players.
The welfare of player 1 under outcome qN is 1(qN) =

P
 
nqNi

  Ci(qNi )

qNi ;
where qNi = argq1 max
h
P

qi +
P
j 6=i q
N
j

  Ci(qi)
i
qi:
If player i produces qNi + "; with " > 0; and all other players produce q
N
 i;
then the change in player is prot is approximately equal to
di  " @i=@qijqi=qNi +
1
2
"2 @2i=@q
2
i

qi=qNi
=
1
2
"2

2P 0(QN) + P 00(QN)qNi   C 00(qNi )

: (4.14)
The assumption that P 0 < 0; P 00  0; and C 00  0 imply that di < 0: The
change in the prot of one of player is rivals, say j, is approximately equal
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to
dj  " @j=@qijqi=qNi +
1
2
"2 @2j=@q
2
i

qi=qNi
= "P 0(QN)qNj +
1
2
"2P 00(QN)qNj :
Note that the change in the average prot of player is rivals is the same as
the change in the prot of a single rival since
1
n  1
P
j 6=i
dj 
1
n  1"P
0(QN)
P
j 6=i
qNj +
1
2
"2P 00(QN)
P
j 6=i
qNj
= "P 0(QN)qNj +
1
2
"2P 00(QN)qNj : (4.15)
The assumption that P 0 < 0 and P 00  0 imply that 1
n 1
P
j 6=i dj < 0: We
see from (4.14) and (4.15) that if player i produces qNi + "; with " > 0; and
all other players produce qN i; then there is a rst order decrease in prots of
player i and a second order decrease in the average prot of player is rivals.
Thus, if player i produces qNi + "; with " > 0; it su¤ers a loss in prots and
also a loss from an increase in inequity aversion given that the average prot
of the rivals becomes smaller than player is prot. If that is the case, then
player i can not gain by producing qNi + "; with " > 0; instead of producing
qNi :
If player i produces qNi +"; with " < 0; and all other players produce q
N
 i; then
the change in player is prot is given by (4.14) and we have that di < 0:
The change in the average prot of player is rivals is given by (4.15) and we
have that 1
n 1
P
j 6=i dj > 0 since " < 0 and the rst term is of rst order
while the second term is of second order. Thus, if player i produces qNi + ";
with " < 0; it su¤ers a loss in prots and also a loss from an increase in
inequity aversion given that the average prot of the rivals becomes greater
than player is prot. If that is the case, then player i can not gain by
producing qNi + "; with " < 0; instead of producing q
N
i : This proves that
qi = q
N
i is the best reply to q
N
 i =
 
qN1 ; : : : ; q
N
i 1; q
N
i+1; : : : q
N
n

and so qN is a
Nash equilibrium of a Cournot oligopoly with inequity averse players.
We now know that the set N IA is non-empty. We still need to show that
if all players are strictly averse to inequity, then q() < q(); that is, N IA
is an interval. We know that q(i) is an increasing function of i and that
q(i) is a decreasing function of i for i = 1; : : : ; n: Note that if at least
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one player does not feel inequity aversion then q() = q(); and N IA is a
singleton. To see this suppose that player i is not inequity averse, that is,
i = i = 0: If that is the case, then h(q; i) = 0 and g(q; i) = 0 imply
that q(0) = qN : If q(i) is an increasing function of i and q(0) = qN ; then
q() = qN : Similarly, if q(i) is a decreasing function of i and q(0) = q
N ;
then q() = qN : So, if at least one player feels aversion to inequity we have
that q() = q() = qN = N IA: We will now show that if all players are
strictly averse to inequity, then q() < q(); that is, N IA is an interval. If
all players are strictly averse to inequity, q(i) is an increasing function of
i and q(0) = qN ; then q() > qN = q(0): Also, if all players are strictly
inequity averse, q(i) is an decreasing function of i and q(0) = q
N ; then
q() < qN = q(0): This shows that q() < q() when all players are strictly
inequity averse, that is the set N IA is an interval. All outcomes in the set
N IA are equilibria of the symmetric Cournot game with inequity aversion
since for any prole of quantities, q i; the quantity qi belongs to the best
response of player i, i = 1; : : : n: Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The quantity produced by each player in the
largest Nash equilibria of N IA is given by q() = min [q(1); : : : ; q(n)] : The
largest Nash equilibria ofN IA is nondecreasing in  sincemin [q(1); : : : ; q(n)]
is nondecreasing in : Similarly, the quantity produced by each player in the
smallest Nash equilibria of N IA is given by q() = max [q(1); : : : ; q(n)] :
The smallest Nash equilibria ofN IA is nonincreasing in  sincemax [q(1); : : : ; q(n)]
is nonincreasing in : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: When all players are strictly averse to inequity
we have q() < qN < q(): Since i is drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion with support on [0; 1] ; the larger is n the most likely it becomes that
min (1; : : : n) is closer to zero, that is, N() is closer to qN : Similarly, since
i is drawn from a uniform distribution with support on [0; 1] ; the larger is
n the most likely it becomes that min (1; : : : ; n) is closer to zero, that is,
that N() is closer to qN : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: The quantity qi(i) is the interception of ti(qj)
with the equal prot curve. From the denition of ti(qj) we have
(1 + i) [P
0(Q)qi + P (Q)  C 0i(qi)]  iP 0(Q)qj = 0:
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In the equal prot curve we have qj = ej(qi): So,
(1 + i) [P
0(qi + ej(qi))qi + P (qi + ej(qi))  C 0i(qi)] iP 0(qi+ej(qi))ej(qi) = 0:
Similarly, the quantity qi(i) is the interception of si(qj) with the equal prot
curve. From the denition of si(qj) we have
(1  i) [P 0(Q)qi + P (Q)  C 0(qi)] + iP 0(Q)qj = 0:
In the equal prot curve we have qj = ej(qi): So,
(1  i) [P 0(qi + ej(qi))qi + P (qi + ej(qi))  C 0i(qi)]+iP 0(qi+ej(qi))ej(qi) = 0:
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: It follows from e1(q2(2))  q1(1) that the best
replies of players 1 and 2 only intersect when q1  e1(q2(2)) and q2 
e2(q1(1)): This together with (4.8) implies that the Nash equilibrium is the
solution to q1 = s1(q2) and q2 = t2(q1): Hence, player 1 fells compassion of
player 2 and player 2 feels envy of player 1. It follows from the denitions of
s1(q2) and t2(q1) that qS2 < q
IA
2 < q
IA
1 < q
S
1 : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: It follows from q1(1) < e1(q2(2)); that the best
replies of players 1 and 2 intersect when e2(q1 (1))  q2  e2(q1(1)) and
e1(q2 (2))  q1  e1(q2(2)). This together with (4.8) implies that the set
of Nash equilibria is given by (4.11). Q.E.D.
.
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